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ACCESS TO JUSTICE FOR THE POOR:   
THE SINGAPORE JUDICIARY AT WORK 
Gary Chan Kok Yew† 
Abstract: This Article examines the concrete efforts and programs of the 
Singapore judiciary to maintain and enhance access to justice for the poor.  This 
examination is undertaken via overlapping economic, procedural, and institutional 
approaches.  The Article will examine three main contentions.  First, that the Singapore 
judiciary’s concrete efforts in maintaining and promoting access to justice for the poor 
have been fairly comprehensive and pro-active.  Second, that abstract constitutional 
discourse on the right of access to justice and the associated rights of legal representation 
and legal aid are virtually absent in Singapore.  Thus, the judicial practice for enhancing 
access to justice for the poor has, to a large extent, surpassed its constitutional rhetoric.  
Third, notwithstanding the concrete judicial efforts thus far, specific recommendations 
are made with a view to further enhancing access to justice for the poor by the Singapore 
judiciary. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
This Article is primarily centered on access to justice for the poor and 
the roles and responsibilities of the Singapore courts.  It is not concerned 
with poverty alleviation per se,1 legal instruments to combat poverty,2 or the 
efforts of the government and civil society to alleviate poverty in Singapore.  
This paper instead examines the following issues:  the meaning of the terms 
“poverty” and “the poor,” the adverse effects of poverty on access to justice, 
the programs implemented by the Singapore courts, and possible judicial 
reforms necessary to enhance access to justice for the poor.  Comparative 
                                           
†
 LL.B (Singapore); LL.M (London); M.A. Southeast Asian Studies (Singapore); B.A. Philosophy 
(London); Associate Professor of Law, School of Law, Singapore Management University.  An earlier draft 
of the paper was presented at the Berlin 2007 International Conference: Law and Society in the 21st 
Century, held from July 25-28, 2007.  The author would like to gratefully acknowledge the funding by the 
Office of Research at the Singapore Management University as well as the valuable data provided by the 
Supreme Court and the Subordinate Courts of Singapore.  The author also wishes to thank Eugene Tan for 
his great help in reviewing portions of an earlier draft.  Any errors or shortcomings belong to the author.  
1
  For works on poverty eradication and alleviation see JEFFREY SACHS, THE END OF POVERTY 
(2005) (discussing the goal of ending extreme poverty in the world by 2025) and C. K. PRAHALAD, THE 
FORTUNE AT THE BOTTOM OF THE PYRAMID (Wharton School Publishing, 2006) (describing private-sector 
involvement in eradicating poverty in developing countries). 
2
  Recently, in Hong Kong, an application for judicial review was taken out by a cleaner and a 
Legislative Councillor to challenge the refusal of the Chief Executive in Council to fix minimum wages as 
provided for in the Trade Boards Ordinance (Cap. 63).  See Chan Noi Heung v. Chief Executive in Council, 
[2007] (C.F.I.) (H.K.) (unpublished judgment), http://legalref.judiciary.gov.hk/doc/judg/word/vetted/other/ 
en/2006/HCAL000126_2006.doc.  The Honourable Hartmann J dismissed the application on the grounds 
that the Chief Executive in Council has not exercised his discretionary power to fix the minimum wages 
contrary to the objects of the legislation.  Id.  In that case, the Chief Executive in Council chose instead to 
take extra-legislative measures to combat poverty at the workplace.  Id.  
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developments in other jurisdictions such as England, the United States, 
Australia, Hong Kong, and Malaysia will also be briefly discussed.  
There are three main contentions examined in this Article.  First, that 
the Singapore judiciary’s concrete efforts in maintaining and promoting 
access to justice for the poor have been fairly comprehensive and pro-active.  
Second, that abstract constitutional discourse on the right of access to justice 
and the associated rights of legal representation and legal aid are virtually 
absent in Singapore.  For this reason, the judicial practice of enhancing 
access to justice for the poor has, to a large extent, surpassed its 
constitutional rhetoric.  Third, notwithstanding the concrete judicial efforts 
thus far, specific recommendations are made with a view to further 
enhancing access to justice for the poor by the Singapore judiciary. 
A. Socioeconomic Progress and Poverty in Singapore 
Singapore’s socioeconomic progress from a Third World country to a 
First World nation since its independence in 1965 has indeed been 
remarkable.3  Its Gross Domestic Product (“GDP”) per capita (in purchasing 
power parity terms) was slightly more than US$28,000 in 2004 (comparable 
to some OECD countries).4  The average annual GDP growth of Singapore 
from 1965 to 2004 was an impressive eight percent.5  Life expectancy and 
literacy rates have also risen in tandem, and the infant mortality rate has 
fallen drastically.6  Singapore’s strong economic fundamentals have also 
enabled it to emerge from the 1997 Asian financial crisis relatively 
unscathed as compared to other Southeast Asian nations.7  
Despite its impressive socioeconomic performance, the Singapore 
island-state of approximately four and a half million people is not entirely 
free of poverty issues.  The figures may vary but they tell a similar story:  
poverty exists in Singapore.  In 1989, the Committee of Destitute Families 
                                           
3
  See The World Bank, Country Groups, http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/ 
DATASTATISTICS/0,,contentMDK:20421402~pagePK:64133150.html (last visited Sept. 3, 2007) 
(showing Singapore is regarded by the World Bank as a developed and high income economy).  The recent 
United Nations Human Development Report 2006 specified Singapore as a high-income and high human 
development nation.  See generally UNITED NATIONS DEV. PROGRAMME, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 
2006, BEYOND SCARCITY: POWER, POVERTY AND THE GLOBAL WATER CRISIS (2006), available at 
http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/hdr06-complete.pdf.   
4
  See UNITED NATIONS DEV. PROGRAMME, supra note 3, at 283.  Note that the report also lists 
corresponding figures for Germany (US$28,303), Italy (US$28,180), and France (US$29,300).  Id.   
5
  See Winston T. H. Koh, Singapore’s Economic Growth Experience, in THE ECONOMIC PROSPECTS 
OF SINGAPORE 1, 1 (Winston T. H. Koh & Roberto Mariano eds., 2006). 
6
  Id. at 1, 3. 
7
  Id. at 5. 
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reported that 23,000 families in Singapore were living in poverty.8  In 1991, 
an estimated 38,000 households fell below the minimum household 
expenditure level.9  Approximately 11% of the resident population had 
household incomes of less than half the median of a meager S$500 per 
month in 1997.10   
The worldwide trend of a widening income gap11 has also taken a 
foothold in Singapore.12  According to the General Household Survey of 
2005, while the average monthly household income between 2000 and 2005 
rose for the top 80% of employed households, the income for the lowest 
10% declined.13  The problem is not, unfortunately, merely manifested in 
cold hard economic figures.  There are also concomitant social repercussions 
such as the social impact of job retrenchments, the creeping social divide, 
and elitism.14  Notwithstanding the above discussion, the incidence of 
poverty in Singapore has decreased markedly since its independence.15  
Further, the current state of poverty in Singapore is relatively manageable 
compared to the gravity and scale of extreme poverty encountered in parts of 
Sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia, and East Asia.16  
                                           
8
  Sandra Davie, Panel’s Call to Govt To Ease Plight of 23,000 Poor Families, STRAITS TIMES 
WKLY. OVERSEAS EDITION (Singapore), Mar. 13, 1993, cited in Garry Rodan, Class Transformations and 
Political Tensions in Singapore’s Development, in THE NEW RICH IN ASIA 35 (Richard Robison & David S. 
G. Goodman eds., 1996). 
9
  See William Lee, The Poor in Singapore: Issues and Options, 31(1) J. OF CONTEMP. ASIA 57, 57-
58 (2001) (stating that the minimum level was set at S$510 for a four-person household living in a 
one-room flat). 
10
  See SING. DEP’T OF STAT., HOUSEHOLD INCOME GROWTH AND DISTRIBUTION 1990-1997, 
OCCASIONAL PAPER, ¶ 25 (1998). 
11
  See WORLD BANK, WORLD VIEW, 2007 WORLD DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS 4 (2007), available at 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/DATASTATISTICS/0,,contentMDK:21298138~pagePK:
64133150.html.  This is based on computations of fifty-nine countries in which forty-six recorded 
increasing income disparity.  Id. 
12
  See Aaron Low, Household Incomes up, Bottom Third’s Wages Down, STRAITS TIMES, Jun. 29, 
2006, available at http://forums.vr-zone.com/archive/index.php/t-77598.html (indicating in the General 
Household Survey that the Gini coefficient for Singapore has increased from 0.490 in 2000 to 0.522 in 
2005). 
13
  See SING. DEP’T OF STAT., GENERAL HOUSEHOLD SURVEY 2005: TRANSPORT, OVERSEAS TRAVEL, 
HOUSEHOLDS AND HOUSING CHARACTERISTICS 28 (2005), http://www.singstat.gov.sg/pubn/popn/ 
ghsr2/ghs05r2.pdf (stating that the earnings of the low-income group have risen in absolute terms in 2006).  
The income disparity persisted despite the fact that average household incomes rose from 2000 to 2005.  
See Id. at 23.  The average monthly household income from work for Singapore resident households in 
2005 was S$5400 and the median household income was S$3830, an increase from 2000 figures.  Id. 
14
  See, e.g., Wikipedia, Wee Shu Min Elitism Scandal, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ 
Wee_Shu_Min_elitism_scandal (last visited Sept. 3, 2007) (discussing the social implications that were 
vividly highlighted in an elitist blog posted by a Singaporean teenage daughter of a Member of Parliament). 
15
  See Lee, supra note 9, at 58-59. 
16
  See SACHS, supra note 1, at 20-24 (stating that the number of poor people in East and South Asia, 
as a whole, has, in fact, declined between 1990 and 2004).  See WORLD BANK, supra note 11, at 4. 
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B. Poverty and Its Impact on Access to Justice 
The traditional method of determining the level of poverty is based on 
the number of people falling below a threshold income.  This measure, 
however, does not take into consideration two factors.  First, the gap 
between the existing poverty level and the amount required to bring the poor 
to the threshold income level (known as “poverty gap”), and second, the 
extent of inequality in the distribution of income amongst the poor.17 
The above measure of poverty and the two factors, though important, 
focus merely on income levels to identify poverty.  Amartya Sen, a recipient 
of the Nobel Prize for Economics, argues that this is not sufficient—poverty 
must also be assessed by examining the “capability to function derivable 
from those incomes.”18  In other words, a “poor” person is one who has 
inadequate income to generate the required levels of functionality.  This 
Article adopts (and adapts) Sen’s definition of poverty in relation to access 
to justice in Singapore.  In this case, the “capability to function” refers to the 
ability of the person to access justice within the parameters of the legal 
system of Singapore.  Thus, the “poor” that this Article focuses on are those 
who have inadequate income that prevents them from obtaining access to 
justice as required by their given situation.  To reinforce the point, the focus 
is the relative capability of the person to obtain access to the justice system 
vis-à-vis the opposing litigant.  In this regard, attention should be paid to the 
costs of legal services and assistance in Singapore.  
Singapore’s society is clearly concerned about legal costs, judging 
from media reports and parliamentary debates as well as comments or 
statements made by lawyers and judges.19  In particular, the Parliament has 
debated the means test (the threshold income levels to assess the applicants’ 
eligibility) for state civil legal aid.20  There is also a notable concern with the 
perceived high earnings of lawyers and law firms in Singapore.21  
This definition of poverty as linked to access to justice may lead, 
however, to problems in the determination of the group of poor people in 
Singapore.  Because a litigant’s ability to obtain access to justice in a given 
situation depends on the type and extent of the legal problems he or she 
encounters, it is impossible to pre-determine in advance a fixed threshold 
                                           
17
  See AMARTYA SEN, POVERTY AND FAMINES 9-23 (1981).  
18
  See AMARTYA SEN, INEQUALITY REEXAMINED 111 (1992). 
19
  See Gary Chan, Re-examining Public Policy—A Case for Conditional Fees in Singapore?, 33 
COMMON L. WORLD REV. 130-32 (2004). 
20
  See, e.g., 70 SINGAPORE PARLIAMENTARY REPORTS, cols. 520-23, 526-27 (Mar. 9, 2001). 
21
  See generally SINGAPORE DEP’T. OF STAT., MINISTRY OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY, CENSUS OF THE 
LEGAL INDUSTRY AND PROFESSION (2001) [hereinafter CENSUS 2001]. 
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income below which a person is regarded as lacking access to justice.  This 
is also one of the reasons that stipulating a threshold income and/or asset 
level to assess eligibility for legal aid is inadequate as a measure of poverty.  
In this regard, the use of contingency or conditional fee agreements, which 
are currently prohibited in Singapore,22 potentially offers more flexibility to 
the litigant.  Such agreements can provide the “sandwich” class, denied legal 
aid under the income and asset thresholds, with greater access to legal 
representation where the financial burden of having to pay the legal fees in 
the event of losing the case is onerous. 
Generally, poverty has an adverse impact on access to justice.  
Litigating in the courts requires financial investment (i.e. lawyers’ fees, court 
fees, and other disbursements) which may not be ultimately recouped by the 
litigant, particularly if he or she loses the case.  If an indigent litigant does 
not possess the requisite financial muscle, he or she might naturally be 
deterred from initiating court action, ceteris paribus.  In addition, if he or 
she has already instituted an action, such a litigant may be coerced to 
discontinue the action due to insufficient funds, even if he or she has a 
strong case.   
The financial resources and ability of the economically poor to make 
use of the legal system, as well as their ability to organize themselves for 
legal action, are generally low.  The poor are generally “one-shotters” within 
the legal system as opposed to “repeat players,”23 such as large corporations.  
A study conducted on persons aged eighteen years and above has indicated 
that there is some positive correlation between the ownership of investments 
and assets and the level of education.24  A recent in-house survey by the 
Subordinate Courts revealed that a substantial majority of the litigants in 
person in the family court and the small claims tribunals are from the low 
                                           
22
  Legal Profession Act, ch. 161, § 107(1)(b) (2001) (Sing.) (stating that the Singapore solicitor shall 
not “enter into any agreement by which he is retained or employed to prosecute any suit or action or other 
contentious proceeding which stipulates for or contemplates payment only in the event of success in that 
suit, act or proceeding”).  In addition, according to section 107(3) of the same Act, he is also subject to the 
law of maintenance and champerty.  See Professional Conduct Rules, r 37(b); Lau Liat Meng v. 
Disciplinary Committee, [1965-1968] Sing. L. Rep. 9; Law Society of Singapore v. Chan Chow Wang, 
[1972-1974] Sing. L. Rep. 636. 
23
  See generally Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of 
Legal Change, 9 L & SOC. REV. 95 (1974) (giving a general discussion concerning repeat players and one-
shot players within the legal system).  It is important to note that Galanter does not equate the “haves” with 
repeat players and the “have-nots” with one-shotters.  See id. at 103.   
24
  See Mei Khee Ng & Yee Liong Yap, Trends in Household Expenditure and Asset Ownership 
1988-1998, STAT. SING. NEWSL.  (Household and Population Statistics Division, Singapore Department of 
Statistics), Jan. 2001, at 4-6; see also Lee, supra note 9, at 57 (stating that the poor in Singapore also 
consists of a disproportionately high percentage of the Malay ethnic group and the elderly). 
600 PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL VOL. 17 NO. 3 
 
 
income group and possess relatively low educational qualifications.25  The 
problem is compounded when the indigent litigant is squared off against an 
opponent who is well-off and financially able to weather delays and bear the 
costs of litigation.  In such a case, even if the well-off litigant has a weak 
case, he or she is unlikely to be deterred from prolonging litigation.  One 
also has to bear in mind that litigation costs can be variable and uncertain, 
factors which are likely to further prejudice the indigent litigant more than 
the financially well-off party. 
II. ACCESS TO JUSTICE IN SINGAPORE:  WHERE JUDICIAL PRACTICE 
TRIUMPHS OVER CONSTITUTIONAL DISCOURSE 
The Singapore legal system is part of the English common law 
tradition with stare decisis, or judicial precedents, as a fundamental pillar in 
the development of local jurisprudence.26  The Singapore judicial hierarchy 
is as follows:  the highest court in the land is the Singapore Court of Appeal, 
followed by the High Court (the Singapore Court of Appeal and High Court 
are collectively called the “Supreme Court”), and then the Subordinate 
Courts.27  The final right of appeal to the Privy Council in London was 
abolished in 1994.28  Singapore judges play significant roles as arbiters of 
legal disputes within the adversarial litigation process and, more generally, 
in the administration of justice in Singapore.  
A. Abstract Constitutional Discourse on the Right of Access to Justice 
Versus Concrete Judicial Practice in Singapore 
Commentators have examined the conceptual and abstract question of 
the legal status of the right of access to justice in Singapore—whether of a 
constitutional or common law character—as well as the concomitant rights 
of legal representation, legal aid, and issues relating to contingency fees.29  
                                           
25
  Centre for Research, eNnovation & Statistics (CReST) of the Subordinate Courts of Singapore, 
Study on Parties in Person 2, 8-9 (July 2005) (unpublished paper, on file with the Pacific Rim Law & 
Policy Journal) [hereinafter CReST Paper]. 
26
  Gary Chan & Eugene Tan, Introduction to the Singapore Legal System, in BASIC PRINCIPLES OF 
SINGAPORE BUSINESS LAW 3, 17-20 (Andrew Phang ed., 2004). 
27
  See Supreme Court of Judicature Act, ch. 322 (2007 Rev. Ed.) (Sing.), available at 
http://statutes.agc.gov.sg/ (search “322” in the “Go to Cap. No.” box; then follow the “Supreme Court of 
Judicature Act” hyperlink). The Subordinate Courts consist of District Courts (including Family Courts), 
Magistrates’ Courts, Juvenile Courts, Coroners’ Courts, and Small Claims Tribunals.  See Subordinate 
Courts Act, ch. 321, § 3(1) (2007 Rev. Ed.) (Sing.), available at http://statutes.agc.gov.sg/ (search “321” in 
the “Go to Cap. No.” box; then follow the “Subordinate Courts Act” hyperlink). 
28
  JUDICIAL COMM. ACT (1985) (repealed 1994).  
29
  See generally Gary Chan, The Right of Access to Justice: Judicial Discourse in Singapore and 
Malaysia, 2 ASIAN J. COMP. L, art. 2, available at http://www.bepress.com/asjcl/vol2/iss1/art2; see 
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While the substantive constitutional right to legal counsel for a person 
arrested by the police is expressly provided for in the Singapore 
Constitution,30 the Court’s interpretation of the scope of the provision has 
thus far been a restrictive one.31  Further, it appears that the rights to legal 
aid32 and legal representation33 do not enjoy constitutional protection in 
Singapore.  According to the court rules, lawyers are assigned to accused 
persons by the Singapore Supreme Court in every capital appeal case,34 but 
these rules are not applicable to all other criminal cases.35  The right of 
access to justice in the form of judicial review of administrative acts may be 
ousted by the enactment of parliamentary legislation in Singapore.36  
Contingency fee agreements between lawyers and clients, which potentially 
increases access to justice to persons not eligible for legal aid but who 
nonetheless find the legal fees beyond their means, are currently prohibited 
in Singapore.37  There has also been little judicial discourse in the case law 
on the general right of access to justice.38  In the same vein, there has been 
little examination by Singapore courts of the associated rights to legal aid 
and the feasibility of contingency fee agreements.39  
However, significant statements have been made outside of 
courtrooms in policy statements and speeches by judges of the Singapore 
                                                                                                                              
generally Li-Ann Thio, Beyond the “Four Walls” in an Age of Transnational Judicial Conversations – 
Civil Liberties, Rights Theories, and Constitutional Adjudication in Malaysia and Singapore, 19 
COLUMBIA J. ASIAN L. 428 (2005-2006). 
30
  SING. CONST. art. 9 (stating that, “[w]here a person is arrested, he shall be informed as soon as 
may be of the grounds of his arrest and shall be allowed to consult and be defended by a legal practitioner 
of his choice.”). 
31
  See Chan, supra note 29, at 30-32. 
32
  See e.g., Airey v. Ireland, 2 Eur. Ct. H.R. 305 (1979) (addressing the obligation of a state to 
provide civil legal aid under Article 6 of the European Convention of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms). 
33
  See generally Kok Seng Chong v. Bukit Turf Club, [1993] 2 Sing. L. Rep. 388 (holding that the 
right of legal representation is based on the principle of natural justice so as to ensure that the litigant is 
able to present his or her case effectively to a tribunal). 
34
  Sing. Sup. Ct. (Crim. App.) R. 11(a) (1997) (making only reference to capital cases).  Rule 11 (b) 
applies to other criminal appeal cases where the Chief Justice considers it in the “interests of justice." 
35
  Id. 
36
  See Chng Suan Tze v. Minister of Home Affairs, [1988] 1 Sing. L. Rep. 132, 162-64 (discussing 
the objective test in reviewing ministerial discretion in issuing preventive orders under the Internal Security 
Act); see also Teo Soh Lung v. Minister for Home Affairs and Others, [1989] Sing. L. Rep, 449 
(highlighting constitutional revisions relating to judicial review); see also Internal Security Act, ch. 143 
(Act 2 of 1995 – Internal Security (Amendment) Act 1989) (Sing.) (amending the Internal Security Act 
limiting the right to judicial review). 
37
  Supra note 22. 
38
  See Chan, supra note 29, at 21-25, 39-40.  See Ong Ah Chuan v. Public Prosecutor 1 Malayan L. 
J. 64 (1980) (holding that the rule of law incorporates fundamental principles of the common law, including 
access to justice).   
39
  See Chan, supra note 29, at 32-39. 
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courts, including the former Chief Justice Yong Pung How, underlining the 
importance of promoting access to justice for the poor.40  The Singapore 
Subordinate Courts’ Justice Statement has also explicitly endorsed “access to 
justice” as one of its two primary aims.41  Furthermore, recent public 
statements by the current Chief Justice Chan Sek Keong on fairness and 
justice suggest some optimism in the horizon for rights-based jurisprudence 
in Singapore.42 
Whatever the content or scope of substantive rights, if the practical 
implementation of schemes to “concretize” these substantive rights is absent 
or seriously lacking, such rights will nonetheless appear to be mere rhetoric.  
Professor Deborah Rhode contended that, in the United States, the 
constitutional jurisprudence and ideal of equal justice is not reflected in the 
legal system as practiced.43  She calls it the “shameful gap between our 
rhetorical commitments and daily practices concerning access to justice.”44  
It is argued that, in Singapore, the situation is, to a considerable extent, the 
reverse of what Professor Rhode described of the U.S. system.  As discussed 
infra, concrete efforts have been made by the Singapore judiciary to 
maintain and promote access to justice for the poor in society, despite the 
relative absence of explicit articulation by the Singapore courts of 
rights-based jurisprudence (in particular, the scope and limits of rights 
relating to access to justice).  The implementation of programs and plans in 
Singapore seeking to maintain or promote access to justice are more 
pronounced than a reading of Singapore’s constitutional jurisprudence on 
access to justice would suggest.  Nevertheless, there are shortcomings or 
areas which may be improved upon. 
                                           
40
  Subordinate Courts 12th Workplan 2003/2004, Anchoring Justice, Subordinate Courts Annual 
Report 1, 7 (2003). Former Chief Justice Yong Pung How said “the Judiciary must guard against the 
obstruction of justice, or more accurately, access to justice.  We must strive to ensure that the public, and 
especially those who are indigent, can seek the redress available through the judicial process . . . .” 
(emphasis added).  Id. 
41
  See The Justice Statement, http://app.subcourts.gov.sg/subcourts/page.aspx?pageid=4397 (last 
visited Sept. 3, 2007). 
42
  Welcome Reference for the Chief Justice, Response by the Honourable the Chief Justice Chan Sek 
Keong (Apr. 22, 2006), ¶¶ 4-5, 11-13 (transcript available at http://app.supremecourt.gov.sg/default. 
aspx?pgID=1001).  The present Chief Justice Chan has explicitly stated that “[t]he fair administration of 
justice must ultimately trump court efficiency and convenience” in the event of a conflict.  Id. 
43
  DEBORAH L. RHODE, ACCESS TO JUSTICE 3 (2004). 
44
  Id. at 5. 
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III. THREE JUDICIAL APPROACHES TO ACCESS TO JUSTICE IN SINGAPORE: 
ECONOMIC, PROCEDURAL, AND INSTITUTIONAL 
The public perception of the Singapore judiciary has been favorable.  
According to a public survey of 1000 participants carried out by Forbes 
Research Pte. Ltd. in 2001, an overwhelming majority of the public strongly 
supported the work of the Subordinate Courts.45  Another public survey was 
carried out in 2006 on the Subordinate Courts.46  The respondents consisted 
of a substantial majority of Singaporeans (91%) as well as a small 
percentage of permanent residents (9%). The results largely corroborated 
those contained in the 2001 survey and pointed to a high level of confidence 
in the judiciary.47  
The performance of the Singapore judiciary has also been 
internationally acclaimed.48  In terms of “legal framework,” the Singapore 
judiciary placed second after Hong Kong in the Institute for Management 
Development’s World Competitiveness Yearbook 2005.49  Moreover, the 
Political and Economic Risk Consultancy, an international consulting firm 
providing business information to companies in East and Southeast Asia, has 
ranked Singapore second in Asia for the quality of its judicial system.50  
Notwithstanding favorable public perception and international 
acclaim, it is nevertheless pertinent to ask whether the Singapore judiciary 
                                           
45
  The main findings obtained from the Subordinate Courts survey showed, based on approximately 
1000 interviews, that: 92% of respondents agreed that there is trust and confidence in the fair 
administration of justice in Singapore; 94% agreed that the Courts are effective in upholding law and order; 
91% opined that the Courts administer justice fairly to all regardless of language, religion, race, or social 
class; 95% agreed that the Courts independently carry out justice according to the law; and 88% agreed that 
the Courts should continue to impose deterrent sentences, especially for offenders with any previous 
criminal records.  (Survey on file with author.) 
46
  SINGAPORE SUBORDINATE COURTS, SURVEY ON ATTITUDES AND PERCEPTION OF THE SINGAPORE 
SUBORDINATE COURTS 2006, (Nov. 2006) (on file with author).  The survey was based on face-to-face 
interviews with over 1000 randomly selected respondents.  Id.  The author has been informed by the 
Subordinate Courts of Singapore that the survey was carried out during the period from September 11 to 
October 8, 2006, by an independent research company, Nexus Link Pte. Ltd. 
47
  Id.  The following are statements asked during the survey about the Singapore judiciary with 
percentages representing respondents who "agree" or "strongly agree" with the statement:  the confidence 
in the fair administration of justice (93%); the accessibility of the court’s facilities (86%); the efficiency of 
the courts (89%); the fair administration of justice regardless of language, religion, race or social class 
(95%); and carrying out of justice according to law without influences of others (91%).  Id.  
48
  See Karen Blochlinger, Primus Inter Pares: Is the Singapore Judiciary First Among Equals?, 9 
PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 591, 616-17 (2000); Tan Ooi Boon, Happy Retirement, CJ, NEW PAPER, Apr. 10, 
2006 (“From the day he became CJ in 1991, ‘public access’ were the two words foremost in his mind.”) 
49
  See SUBORDINATE COURTS ANNUAL REPORT 2005 53 (2005), 
http://app.subcourts.gov.sg/subcourts/page.aspx?pageid=4469. 
50
  See POLITICAL & ECONOMIC RISK CONSULTANCY LTD., ASIAN INTELLIGENCE (2006) (on file with 
the Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal); see also JAMES GWARTNEY, ROBERT LAWSON, & WILLIAM 
EASTERLY, ECONOMIC FREEDOM OF THE WORLD REPORT 2006 (2006). 
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has indeed lived up to the expectations of enhancing access to justice for the 
poor.  In order to respond to the question, this central Section adopts a 
three-fold approach.  The activities, programs, and schemes undertaken by 
the Singapore courts with a view toward enhancing access to justice may be 
conveniently categorized as economic, procedural, and institutional (or 
organizational).51   
In this context, the economic approach refers to direct fiscal measures 
undertaken by the Singapore judiciary to reduce the economic burden or 
lower the economic barriers to access to the courts encountered by indigent 
litigants.  The procedural approach refers to court procedures and rules used 
to enhance access to justice for litigants.  This may include procedural 
reforms such as amending court rules, developing the rules of locus standi 
through case law, and streamlining court processes to reduce delays in the 
judicial system.  While institutional measures could embody procedural 
measures, they tend to be large-scale and often require an overhaul in the 
way the court’s roles are conceived.  This third category includes the 
workings of the small claims tribunals, court-based mediation, the use of 
technology, as well as judicial approaches towards legal aid, pro bono work, 
and litigants in person.52  
Before discussing the three judicial approaches to access to justice, it 
should be noted that absolute access to justice is not necessarily a desirable 
objective.  First, access to justice requires funding of legal services which 
would mean less investment in other important areas such as education and 
health.  Second, a balance should be properly struck between promoting 
access to justice for the poor and ensuring that the indigent litigant acts 
responsibly before initiating action.  Imagine a scenario where the 
government holds a largesse for implementing legal aid programs.  This does 
not mean that the government should dole out monies indiscriminatingly to 
all persons below a specified income level with a view to enhancing access 
to justice for the poor. Indeed, a serious-minded government would be 
concerned with irresponsible litigation in the guise of vexatious and 
frivolous claims, an undesirable feature of over-litigiousness in society.  Part 
of this problem of vexatious and frivolous claims may be resolved by the 
                                           
51
  See Mauro Cappelletti & Bryant Garth, Access to Justice As A Focus of Research, 1 WINDSOR 
YEARBOOK OF ACCESS TO JUSTICE ix, x-xiv (1981).  In a similar (though not precisely the same) fashion, 
Mauro Cappelletti and Bryant Garth described the access-to-justice movement as comprising three waves 
of reform, namely:  1) procedural availability of lawyers to the poor, 2) providing legal representation for 
diffuse interests, and 3) experimenting with new forms of representation and new dispute processing 
institutions. 
52
  Commonly referred to as pro se litigants in the United States and unrepresented litigants in 
Australia. 
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filtering mechanisms of a competent judicial system.  But costs may already 
be wasted midway through the judicial process.  Thus, the government 
would also want to minimize waste at the earliest stage possible, such as 
when the litigant applies for legal aid from the state legal aid authority.  State 
legal aid authorities may, for example, implement a merits test to assess the 
viability of claims sought by applicants for aid.  Thus, in the final analysis, 
the actual implementation of access to justice programs involves a balancing 
of the qualitative objective of extending access and the quantitative aim of 
preventing unnecessary litigation and waste of costs.  As one judge wittingly 
noted, “[j]ustice may be priceless. But it is not costless.”53 
A. Economic Measures Have Been Utilized to Control and Manage 
Litigation Costs 
The role of alleviating poverty generally belongs to the government. 
In this respect, the Singapore government has stoutly resisted implementing 
a general welfare system.54  In fact, the Singapore government has criticized 
the vagaries and “crutch” mentality associated with welfare states.55  
Recently, it has resisted calls for greater increases in the amount of public 
assistance for the needy.56  In the face of such criticism and dissatisfaction, 
the government has often emphasized its role in distributing monetary hand-
outs to benefit the needy, and its focus on “workfare” instead of welfare to 
assist older low-income earners.57  Since the 1980s, the government has 
established ethnic self-help groups such as the Chinese Development 
                                           
53
  See Sir Ivor Richardson, Courts and Access to Justice, 31 VICT. U. WELLINGTON L. REV. 163, 171 
(2000). 
54
  Lee Hsien Loong, Prime Minister, Singapore, statement in Parliament (Nov. 13, 2006) (saying 
“[w]e have treated welfare as a dirty word.  The opposition, I think the Worker’s Party, has called for a 
‘permanent unconditional needs-based welfare system.’  I think that is an even dirtier five words . . . .” ) in 
82 SINGAPORE PARLIAMENTARY REPORTS, cols. 745-48 (Nov. 13, 2006). 
55
  See M. Ramesh, Social Security in Singapore: Redrawing the Public-Private Boundary 32 (12) 
ASIAN SURVEY 1093, 1103 (1992).  
56
  The cash grant of S$260 under the Public Assistance scheme was only increased by between S$30 
and S$115 per month to take into consideration inflation and to counteract the hike in the Good and 
Services Tax from the existing 5% to 7%.  See Jasmine Yin, Money Not Enough: MP Neo, TODAY ONLINE, 
Mar. 10, 2007. 
57
  See, e.g., MINISTER OF FINANCE, SINGAPORE BUDGET STATEMENT 2007 28, ¶ 4.8, (2007), 
http://www.mof.gov.sg/budget_2007/budget_speech/downloads/FY2007_Budget_Statement.pdf.  The 
workfare scheme is envisaged to complement the existing Central Provident Fund (“CPF”) contributions by 
both employer and employee, a social security scheme to ensure adequate retirement savings.  See id.  The 
government will provide the low-income workers with income supplements to be paid partly in cash and 
partly into the CPF.  Id. ¶ 4.10.  At the same time, the workers will contribute less to the CPF so as to 
increase their take-home pay.  Employers contribute less to the CPF so that the cost of employing the 
worker decreases.  This is expected to increase worker employability.  To counter the increase in the Goods 
and Services Tax (GST), GST credits are given out in the form of cash to Singaporeans, with lower-income 
earners obtaining a larger amount than persons in the higher-income category.  Id. ¶ 6.3. 
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Assistance Council, Mendaki, and the Singapore Indian Development 
Association in order to raise the living standards and education of the 
respective ethnic groups.58  It has also encouraged private and volunteer 
organizations,59 as well as the community, to share the burden of providing 
social services to the disadvantaged.60 
By contrast, Singapore’s judiciary, comprised of unelected judges, 
does not assist directly in alleviating poverty.  The Singapore judiciary (both 
the Supreme Court and Subordinate Courts) is, however, allocated a budget 
each year with which to achieve its targeted outcomes with respect to the 
administration of justice.61  This Section focuses on fiscal measures the 
Singapore Judiciary has undertaken to enhance access to justice for the poor 
in Singapore.   
1. Imposition of Hearing Fees and Other Court Fees 
The imposition of hearing and court fees may have serious 
ramifications for access to justice, as evidenced in the English case of 
Witham.62  There, the Lord Chancellor was empowered to increase court fees 
under the U.K. Supreme Court Act 1981.63  The new regulations64 removed 
provisions that had exempted and remitted fees for litigants.  Upon 
reviewing the new regulations, the English court determined that the 
                                           
58
  See Gillian Koh & Ooi Giok Ling, Relationship Between State and Civil Society in Singapore: 
Clarifying the Concepts, Assessing the Ground in CIVIL SOCIETY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA 167, 171 (Lee Hock 
Guan ed., 2004). 
59
  See id. at 170-71.  Apart from ethnic and clan groups, the private organizations include 
religion-based community welfare services, philanthropic foundations, and other non-governmental 
organizations. 
60
  For works on government and civil society involvement, see generally Suzaina Kadir, 
Engagement and Autonomy Within The Political Status Quo, in CIVIL SOCIETY AND POLITICAL CHANGE IN 
ASIA: EXPANDING AND CONTRACTING DEMOCRATIC SPACE, 324-54 (Muthiah Alagappa ed., 2004); Koh & 
Ling, supra note 58, at 171; Yayoi Tanaka, Subtle NGO Control by a Developmentalist Welfare State, in 
THE STATE AND NGOS: PERSPECTIVES FROM ASIA, 200-221 (Shinichi Shigetomi ed., 2002).  For the 
relationship between the state and the voluntary welfare sector see David Seth Jones, Welfare and Public 
Management in Singapore: A Study of State and Voluntary Sector Partnership, 24(1) ASIAN J. PUB. ADMIN. 
57 (2002). 
61
  See Gov’t of Sing., Budget 2007-Expenditure Overview, 
http://www.mof.gov.sg/budget_2007/expenditure_overview/judicature.html (last visited Feb. 28, 2008).  In 
fiscal year 2007, the Judiciary was allocated a total of S$119.56 million consisting of S$68 million 
(Supreme Court) and S$51.56 million (Subordinate Courts).  In fiscal year 2006, the total allocation was 
S$124 million, consisting of S$57 million (Supreme Court operations), S$13 million (final payments for 
the construction of the Supreme Court Building) and S$54 million (Subordinate Courts operations): see 
Gov’t of Sing., Budget 2006-Expenditure Overview, 
http://www.mof.gov.sg/budget_2006/expenditure_overview/judicature.html (last visited Feb. 29, 2008). 
62
  R v. Lord Chancellor, Ex parte Witham, (1998) Q.B. 575 (U.K.). 
63
  Supreme Court Act, 1981, c. 54, § 130 (U.K.). 
64
  Supreme Court Fees (Amendment) Order, 1996, S.I. 1996/3191, L. 15, art. 3 (Supreme Court of 
England and Wales). 
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regulations were indeed ultra vires as they denied the applicant his 
constitutional right of access to justice.65  There has not, however, been a 
similar constitutional challenge in Singapore. 
Hearing fees were introduced in the Singapore Supreme Court in 
199366 and in the Subordinate Courts in 1994.67  The official rationale for the 
imposition of hearing fees was to ensure that the litigants would use court 
time responsibly and expeditiously.68  Singapore has put in place measures to 
address concerns that access to justice may have been impeded or truncated 
by the imposition of such fees.  First, the amount of hearing fees imposed 
depends on the level of court in which a civil case is litigated69 and the 
number of hearing days required.  Significantly lower fees are applicable for 
claims commenced in lower courts.  No hearing fees are imposed in the first 
three days of hearing in the High Court and the first day of hearing before 
the Court of Appeal, district court, and magistrate’s court.70  There are also 
important exclusions of certain types of proceedings from the hearing fees 
levy.71   
Second, the registrar of the court is empowered to adjust the fees of 
litigants in specific circumstances.  Upon the application of a litigant, the 
registrar72 may apportion the fees among all or any of the litigants.73  
                                           
65
  R v. Lord Chancellor, Ex parte Witham, (1998) Q.B. 575, 586 (U.K.). 
66
  Supreme Court (Amendment) Rules 1993 S. 213/93, Order 90A (Sing.); JEFFREY PINSLER, CIVIL 
JUSTICE IN SINGAPORE 123 (2000). 
67
  Subordinate Courts (Amendment) Rules 1994, S 260/94, (Sing.); JEFFREY PINSLER, CIVIL JUSTICE 
IN SINGAPORE 123 (2000). 
68
  JEFFREY PINSLER, CIVIL JUSTICE IN SINGAPORE 123 (2000); JEFFREY PINSLER, SINGAPORE COURT 
PRACTICE 2006 1780 (2006). 
69
  The hearing fees for each day or part thereof after the first day are S$250 (Magistrates’ Courts) 
and S$500 (District Courts).  See Rules of Court, 2006, R.5, Rev. Ed. (Sing.), Order 90A, r. 1(1).  With 
respect to the High Court, where the “value” of the claim is S$1 million or below, the hearing fee per day 
correlates positively to the number of hearing days:  the fee for the fourth day amounts to S$6000; the fee 
for the fifth day is S$2000; between the sixth and tenth day, litigants pay S$3000 per day; beyond the tenth 
day, the fee amounts to S$5000 per day.  Id.  In the event the “value” of the claim exceeds S$1 million, the 
corresponding amounts of hearing fees for the abovementioned hearing periods are S$9000, S$3000, 
S$5000, and S$7000 respectively.  Id.  For hearings before the Court of Appeal, the hearing fees for each 
day or part thereof subsequent to the first day is a fixed sum of S$4000 (for “value” of up to S$1 million) 
and S$6000 (for “value” of more than S$1 million) respectively.  Id; see also id. at Order 91 r. 1(3) (listing 
the rules for determining the “value” of the claim). 
70
  Id. 
71
  For example, actions for damages for death or personal injuries and causes or matters under the 
Adoption of Children Act, Guardianship of Infants Act and Women’s Charter have been exempted. See 
Rules of Court, 2006, R.5, Rev. Ed. (Sing.), Order 90A, r. 3. 
72
  The Registrar of the Supreme Court of the Subordinate Courts (as the case may be), see Rules of 
Court, 2006, R.5, Rev. Ed. (Sing.), Order 1, r. 4., is a legally qualified person appointed under section 61 of 
the Supreme Court of Judicature Act, Cap. 322, 2007 Rev. Ed., and section 12 of the Subordinate Courts 
Act, Cap. 321, 2007 Rev. Ed., respectively to exercise both judicial and administrative powers and duties. 
73
  Rules of Court, 2006, R.5, Rev. Ed. (Sing.), Order 90A, r. 5. 
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Alternatively, the registrar may waive or defer payment of the fees 
altogether to alleviate the litigant’s financial burden.74  Though the specific 
financial criteria are not explicitly stated in the Rules of Court, the aggrieved 
party is entitled to apply to the High Court to review the registrar’s 
decision.75  According to the registrar of the Supreme Court, the financial 
condition of the litigant will be taken into consideration in determining the 
requests for waiver or deferment.76  In fact, in order to reduce the economic 
burden on the poor, there have at times been general reductions or waivers 
of hearing fees by the Singapore judiciary to account for adverse economic 
conditions affecting court users.77   
In December 2002, hearing fees were revised upwards in reaction to 
the judiciary’s concerns that an “inordinate number of court days” were 
required in an increasing number of cases.78  The former Chief Justice Yong, 
however, explained that the upwards revision affected only a small portion 
of cases.79  A large majority of the cases affected involved high-value 
businesses.  The fee revision was also a necessary response to the increase in 
the total operating costs of the Supreme Court.80  Significantly, the former 
Chief Justice added that “access to justice should not be denied to those who 
do not have the financial means.81  As such, the registrar has the discretion to 
waive or defer the payment of fees in cases of genuine hardship.”82  
The amount of court fees levied is determined by the Chief Justice or 
the Senior District Judge with the concurrence of the Chief Justice.83  As 
                                           
74
  Id. at r. 1(3), r. 2(3). 
75
  Id. at r. 6.  As of May 9, 2007, however, the Supreme Court has confirmed that it has not received 
any requests for review of the Registrar’s decisions.  With respect to the Subordinate Courts, see Loh 
Chong Yong Thomas v. Standard Chartered Bank, [2007] S.G.D.C. 82, ¶ 6, in which an application for the 
waiver of court fees was made by the plaintiff (a practicing lawyer who was bankrupt).  The application 
was dismissed by the deputy registrar, and the appeal to the District Judge in chambers was also dismissed.  
76
  See E-mail from the registrar of the Supreme Court to author (May 9, 2007) (on file with the 
author). 
77
  Hearing fees were waived for the first three days of hearings before a judge of the High Court 
pursuant to the Rules of Court (Amendment) Rules 2003 during the global economic downturn arising from 
the Iraq War and outbreak of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (“SARS”) to “[a]meliorate the impact of 
the current economic downturn facing litigants . . . .” See Media Release, Singapore Supreme Court, 
Waiver of Hearing Fees in the High Court (May 23, 2003), http://app.supremecourt.gov.sg/ 
default.aspx?pgid=424&printFriendly=true. 
78
  See Chief Justice Yong Pung How, Chief Justice’s Response: Opening of the Legal Year 2003, ¶ 
19 (Jan. 4, 2003) (transcript available at http://app.supremecourt.gov.sg/default.aspx?pgid= 
504&printFriendly=true). 
79
  Id. ¶ 21. 
80
  Id. 
81
  Id. 
82
  Id.  See also Revision of Hearing Fees and Filing Fees, Registrar’s Circular No. 5, 2002, (Supreme 
Court of Singapore), http://app.supremecourt.gov.sg/data/doc/ManagePage/99/2002%20-%205.pdf (last 
visited Feb. 29, 2008). 
83
  Rules of Court, 2006, R.5, Rev. Ed. (Sing.), Order 91, r. 2.  
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with hearing fees, the registrar possesses the discretion to waive and defer 
the payment of the fees in whole or in part.84  Moreover, lower court fees are 
levied for proceedings falling under specific legislation, such as the Mental 
Disorders and Treatment Act, the Adoption of Children Act, the 
Guardianship of Infants Act, or the Inheritance (Family Provision) Act.85  
According to the Singapore Supreme Court, fees are waived for the 
inspection of court files by particular categories of persons, namely 
applicants that work for certain public agencies and persons receiving legal 
aid from the Legal Aid Bureau.86   
2. Judicial Supervision over Litigation Costs 
In Singapore, a litigant’s legal costs include solicitor-client costs, the 
litigant’s own costs as well as the litigant’s own disbursements.87  The 
solicitor-client costs generally constitute a major component of legal costs.88  
Unlike in the United States, should the prospective litigant in Singapore lose 
his or her case, the fee-shifting rules (as in England) typically require that he 
or she bear the opposing party’s costs,89 which can be financially onerous.   
Nevertheless, this fee-shifting requirement under Singapore law is not 
an invariable rule.90  Moreover, legal costs in Singapore are not regarded as 
being unduly high.  In fact, Asia-Pacific Legal 500, an information guide to 
law firms in the region, reported that lawyers’ fees in Singapore are 
generally competitive.91  However, as discussed below, lower income 
earners nevertheless find legal costs in Singapore financially burdensome.  
                                           
84
  Id. r. 5. 
85
  See Rules of Court, 2006, R.5, Rev. Ed. (Sing.), app. B, ¶¶ 117-31. 
86
  These applicants are the Police, Internal Security Department, the Commercial Affairs 
Department, the Singapore Academy of Law, the Attorney-General’s Chambers and the Insolvency and 
Public Trustee’s Office. See E-mail from the Registrar of the Supreme Court to author (May 9, 2007) (on 
file with the author). 
87
  Disbursements include court fees, for example, hearing fees and fees levied on the submission and 
registration of court documents. 
88
  In a typical case, the disbursements would take up only a small proportion of the litigant’s total 
costs. 
89
  See the general “costs follow the event” rule in Rules of the Court, Order 59 r. 3(2); Tullio v. 
Maoro, [1994] 2 Sing. L. Rep. 489.   
90
  The Court has the discretion to depart from the general “costs follow the event” rule.  See id.; see 
also the recent English case of R (Corner House Research) v. Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, 
[2005] 1 W.L.R. 2600 (where the court granted a protective costs order in public law cases of general 
public importance to enable claimants of limited means access to the court without the fear of substantial 
costs order being made against them); cf. Arkin v. Bouchard Lines Ltd. (Nos. 2 & 3), [2005] 1 W.L.R. 3055 
(which held that third party professional funders for a claimant with limited means via a non-champertous 
agreement, with the expectation of reward if the claimant succeeded, were liable to pay costs to the 
successful defendants in the action). 
91
  According to ASIA-PACIFIC LEGAL 500, “Singapore's legal market is extremely competitive.  Fees 
remain at relatively low levels, particularly among Singaporean clients who, as a result, receive some of the 
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Under the Singapore civil justice system, the courts have the power to 
determine the party-party costs as well as solicitor-client costs in the taxation 
of costs.92  The courts may supervise litigation costs, whether in the context 
of a costs agreement between disputing parties or outside the parameters of a 
costs agreement. 
The courts supervise contentious business agreements on solicitor-
client costs based on the principles of fairness and reasonableness as 
provided for in the Legal Profession Act.93  In this context, the Singapore 
High Court in Shamsudin bin Embun v. P T Seah & Co.94 held that in a case 
where the client seeks to impeach the fairness and reasonableness of a 
contentious business agreement for costs, it is the lawyer who bears the onus 
of proving its fairness and reasonableness.95  In determining whether the 
agreement passed the criterion of fairness, the issue was whether, on the 
facts, the client understood the contents of the agreement.  In the present 
case, the Court took note of the need to protect the client, a “poor old, retired 
pensioner who had always had a low station in life, [and who] was ignorant 
of the law and its arcane procedures.”96   
The judicial power of supervision overcosts on the basis of fairness 
and reasonableness extends even to situations where a prior agreement 
required the client to pay higher costs.  In Wong Foong Chai v. Lin Kuo 
Hao,97 the High Court stated that there was no conclusive presumption under 
the Rules of Court98 that the amount expressly or impliedly approved by the 
client would be reasonable in amount.99  Citing section 113 of the Legal 
Profession Act,100 the judge held that the costs agreement was not immune 
                                                                                                                              
best-value legal advice in the world . . . .” cited in 74 SINGAPORE PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES REPORT, col. 
1211 (May 15, 2002). The CENSUS 2001 included a survey which incorporated data on the earnings of 
lawyers in relation to the median billable rate per hour in 2000.  See CENSUS 2001, supra note 21, at 4. The 
median billable rate per hour was as follows: S$200-S$299 (for lawyers with fewer than three years of 
experience); S$300-S$399 (for lawyers with between three and twelve years of experience); and 
S$400-S$499 (for lawyers with more than twelve years of experience).  Id.   
92
  Taxation of costs refers to the determination by the court as to the amount of costs payable by one 
party to another or by a client to the solicitor, as the case may be.  Rules of Court, 2006, R.5, Rev. Ed. 
(Sing.), Order 59, r. 27-28. 
93
  The court is empowered under the Legal Profession Act, 2001, c. 161, § 113 (Sing.) to enforce the 
agreement; where the terms of the agreement are deemed by the court to be unfair or unreasonable, it may 
be declared void. 
94
  Shamsudin bin Embun v. P T Seah & Co., [1986] 1 Sing. L. Rep. 510. 
95
  Id. at 516. 
96
  Id. at 518.  The costs agreement was also adjudged “unreasonable” as the lawyer was “dilatory” in 
the prosecution of the client’s case which was of “ordinary simplicity.”  Id. at 519. 
97
  Wong Foong Chai v. Lin Kuo Hao, [2005] 3 Sing. L. Rep. 74. 
98
  Rules of Court, 2006, R.5, Rev. Ed. (Sing.), Order 59, r. 28(2)(b). 
99
  Wong Foong Chai v. Lin Kuo Hao, [2005] 3 Sing. L. Rep. 74, 82-84. 
100
  Legal Profession Act, 2001, c. 161 (Sing.). 
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from investigation by the court.101  Indeed, based on the facts of the case, as 
the amount of costs agreed to was “jarringly out of proportion” to that for 
similar work done by a lawyer, the presumption was rebutted.102  
The judiciary also supervises legal costs outside the context of costs 
agreements.  For example, legal costs are pre-determined under Order 59, 
Appendix 2 of the Rules of Court, where the amount of costs is positively 
correlated to the damages claimed or awarded in motor accident cases in 
respect to party-party costs.103  There are also specific provisions relating to 
the litigants receiving legal aid from the Legal Aid Bureau as well as the 
litigants in person.  To protect the legally-aided person, he or she should not 
be liable for both the court fees and the costs to the other party should the 
opposing party win.104  As for the litigant in person without formal legal 
representation, the Singapore legal position is that such a person is entitled 
to such costs as would reasonably compensate him or her for time expended, 
together with all expenses reasonably incurred.105  
As another example of the supervisory role adopted by the courts, it is 
statutorily provided that, if an action commenced in the High Court could 
have been initiated in the lower courts (district and magistrates’ courts), and 
the plaintiff recovers an amount not exceeding the relevant lower court limit, 
the plaintiff is only entitled to (lower) costs generally awarded on the lower 
court scale.106  The explicit judicial rationale for such practice, apart from 
preventing abuse of the judicial process, lies in fostering a cheaper and more 
efficient process.107  In Cheong Ghim Fah v. Murugian s/o Rangasamy (No. 
2), the High Court reasoned that lawyers should not incur unnecessary costs 
if a more economical and equally expeditious process of dispute resolution, 
such as in the Subordinate Courts, exists. 108   
In summation, the Singapore judiciary has put in place fairly 
comprehensive economic measures, whether by promulgating rules or 
through its court decisions, to control and manage litigation costs, including 
lawyers’ fees, solicitor-client costs, party-party costs, court fees, and hearing 
fees. 
                                           
101
  Wong Foong Chai v. Lin Kuo Hao, [2005] 3 Sing. L. Rep. 74, 84. 
102
  Id. 
103
  Rules of Court, 2006, R.5, Rev. Ed. (Sing.), Order 59, app. 2. 
104
  Legal Aid and Advice Act, 2001, c. 160, § 12(4) (Sing.).  The legally-aided person is, however, 
entitled to the costs if he wins. 
105
  Rules of Court, 2006, R.5, Rev. Ed. (Sing.), Order 59, r. 18A. 
106
  Subordinate Courts Act, 1999, c. 321, § 39 (Sing.). 
107
  See Uni-Navigation v. Wei Loong Shipping, [1993] 1 Sing. L. Rep. 876, 880 (per Selvam J.C.). 
108
  Cheong Ghim Fah v. Murugian s/o Rangasamy (No. 2), [2004] 3 Sing. L. Rep. 193, 195. 
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B. Litigation and Court Procedures Have Been Utilized to Enhance 
Access to Justice 
An examination of the judicial role in enhancing access to justice 
would not be complete without a discussion of litigation and court 
procedures as interpreted and applied by the courts.  As Justice Andrew 
Phang of the Singapore Court of Appeal observed, the procedural aspects of 
a particular case can profoundly affect substantive justice and vice versa in a 
mutual and integrative process: 
The quest for justice . . . entails a continuous need to balance 
the procedural with the substantive.  More than that, it is a 
continuous attempt to ensure that both are integrated, as far as 
that is humanly possible.  Both interact with each other.  One 
cannot survive without the other.  There must, therefore, be—as 
far as is possible—a fair and just procedure that leads to a fair 
and just result.  This is not merely abstract theorising.  It is the 
very basis of what the courts do—and ought to do.  When in 
doubt, the courts would do well to keep these bedrock 
principles in mind.  This is especially significant because, in 
many ways, this is how, I believe, laypersons perceive the 
administration of justice to be.  The legitimacy of the law in 
their eyes must never be compromised.  On the contrary, it 
should, as far as is possible, be enhanced.109 
Such procedural measures are found in legislation, rules of court, and the 
administrative circulars and practice directions issued by the courts.  
Procedure involves judicial case management, streamlining litigation, and 
court procedures.  This Article focuses on the manner and extent to which 
the procedures, as interpreted and applied by the courts, affect the level of 
access to justice of the poor in Singapore.  The central issues examined in 
this Section are:  1) the extent that the poor are capable of organizing 
themselves to obtain remedies under existing litigation procedures (such as 
the use of relator actions, rules of locus standi, and representative actions) 
and 2) the extent that courts have reformed and developed procedural rules 
and guidelines and have streamlined the judicial processes to enable the poor 
to obtain greater access to justice, bearing in mind that procedures should 
not get in the way of the litigants’ substantive claims and rights.110  
                                           
109
  United Overseas Bank Limited v. Ng Huat Foundations Pte. Ltd., [2005] 2 Sing. L. Rep. 425, ¶ 8. 
110
  See Sivaras Rasiah v. Badan Peguam Malaysia, [2002] 2 Malayan L. J. 413, 422 (Gopal Sri Ram 
J.C.A.). 
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1. Relator Actions Are Not Useful for Enhancing Access to Justice for 
the Poor 
In relator actions, one or more members of the public who wish to 
protect public interests can sue in the name of the Attorney-General.111  
Insofar as access to justice for the poor is concerned, relator actions against 
the government appear to be non-starters, though the technical procedural 
requirements of such an action are specifically provided for in the Rules of 
Court.112  This is because relator actions, which require the Attorney-General 
to initiate an action for the purpose of vindicating public rights against the 
government, are arguably contrary to the role of the Attorney-General as the 
government legal adviser.113  Not surprisingly, relator actions against the 
government are rare in Singapore.  
While there has been no clear pronouncement by the Singapore courts 
on relator actions, the viability of relator actions in the context of public 
interest litigation has been explicitly thrown into doubt by the Malaysian 
courts.  Although Malaysian court decisions are not binding on the 
Singapore judiciary, the logic of the dissenting justices in the Malaysian 
decision below, insofar as relator actions against the government are 
concerned, is compelling.  The argument is particularly persuasive given that 
the constitutional provisions concerning the duty of the Attorney-General as 
the government legal advisor are similar in Singapore and Malaysia.   
In Government of Malaysia v. Lim Kit Siang,114 the Respondent, an 
opposition politician, sought an injunction to restrain a company from 
signing a highway construction contract with the Malaysian government on 
the basis of allegations of corruption.  The Malaysian Supreme Court had 
earlier granted an interlocutory injunction115 but an application was 
subsequently sought to set this injunction aside.116  In Lim Kit Siang v. 
United Engineers (M) Bhd (No. 2), the Malaysian high court dismissed the 
                                           
111
  See, e.g., Singapore Government Proceedings Act, 1985, c. 121, §§ 8-9, on actions relating to 
public nuisance and trusts for public, religious, social and charitable purposes.  
112
  Rules of the Court, Order 15, r. 11. 
113
  CONST. SING. art. 35, §7. According to article 35, section 7 of the Constitution, “It shall be the 
duty of the Attorney-General to advise the Government upon such legal matters and to perform such other 
duties of a legal character, as may from time to time be referred or assigned to him by the President or the 
Cabinet and to discharge the functions conferred on him by or under this Constitution or any other written 
law.” 
114
  Government of Malaysia v. Lim Kit Siang, [1988] 2 Malayan L. J. 12. 
115
  Lim Kit Siang v. United Engineers (M) Bhd (No. 2), [1988] 1 Malayan L. J. 50, 53 (Tan Sri Lee 
Hun Hoe C.J. (Borneo), Tan Sri Wan Suleiman and Tan Sri Wan Hamzah S.C. JJ.).  The order for 
injunction was made with liberty to the parties to apply.  Id. 
116
  Id. 
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application.117  On appeal, the majority judges118 in Government of Malaysia 
v. Lim Kit Siang refused to grant the injunction, regarding the action by the 
respondent as vexatious, frivolous, and an abuse of the judicial process.119  
The dissenting judge, Seah S.C.J., argued persuasively that a relator action is 
not applicable in public interest litigation to test the legality of governmental 
action.120  This is because the Attorney General, as the principal legal 
advisor of the Cabinet and/or Minister of the Government of Malaysia, is not 
expected under the Federal Constitution to consent to the initiation of such 
court proceedings.121  Indeed, the Attorney General is mandated to defend 
the action as part of his constitutional duty.122  Abdoolcader S.C.J., the other 
dissenting judge, opined that the “question of a relator action must 
necessarily remain attractive as a theoretical possibility with no conceivable 
hope generally for practical purposes of advancing to concrete action beyond 
that.”123  It should also be observed that V.C. George J. in the Malaysian high 
court case of Lim Kit Siang v. United Engineers (M) Bhd. (No. 2)124 referred 
to relator actions in the name of the Attorney General as “archaic and 
impracticable.”  In view of the above considerations, relator actions are 
likely not feasible as a means for enhancing access to justice for the poor in 
litigation against the government. 
However, relator actions against non-government bodies such as the 
Law Society and private pro bono organizations to vindicate a right of 
access to justice are not precluded by the same legal reasoning applicable to 
relator actions against the government.  In the Malaysian case of 
Attorney-General at and by the Relation of Pesurohjaya Ibu Kota 
(Commissioner Of The Federal Capital), Kuala Lumpur v. Wan Kam Fong 
(“Wan Kam Fong”),125 relator actions were explicitly endorsed against the 
Defendant, a private entity that was carrying on a restaurant business 
without a license.  The court held that the Attorney General was empowered 
under the English common law to bring a relator action pursuant to section 
                                           
117
  Lim Kit Siang v. United Engineers (M) Bhd (No. 2), [1988] 1 Malayan L. J. 50, 64 (V.C. George 
J.). 
118
  Government of Malaysia v. Lim Kit Siang, [1988] 2 Malayan L. J. 12 (Salleh Abas L.P., Abdul 
Hamid C.J., and Hashim Yeop A. Sani S. C.J). 
119
  Id. at 12. 
120
  Id. at 36. 
121
  Id. 
122
  Id. 
123
  Id. at 45. 
124
  Lim Kit Siang v. United Engineers (M) Bhd. (No. 2), [1988] 1 Malayan L. J. 50, 59. 
125
  Attorney-General at and by the Relation of Pesurohjaya Ibu Kota (Commissioner Of The Federal 
Capital), Kuala Lumpur v. Wan Kam Fong, [1967] 2 Malayan L. J. 72. 
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three of the Civil Law Ordinance, 1956.126  Significantly, the Defendants had 
contended, in a similar vein to the arguments made in Lim Kit Siang, that 
relator actions could not succeed since the Malaysian Constitution provided 
that the Attorney General was the adviser of the government.127  However, 
this argument was rejected by the judge.128  The defendant in Wan Kam Fong 
was not a government body, unlike in Lim Kit Siang. 
The positive outcome from cases such as Wan Kam Fong appears to 
be that relator actions, though impracticable with respect to actions against 
the government, remain applicable to vindicate a right of access to justice 
against a non-government body, provided that the existence of a public 
wrong caused by the defendant can be established.  With respect to the 
Singapore Law Society in particular, one of its aims is to “protect and assist 
the public in Singapore in all matters touching or ancillary or incidental to 
the law” under the Legal Profession Act.129  It is also required under the 
same statute to “make provision for or assist in the promotion of a scheme 
whereby impecunious persons on non-capital charges are represented by 
advocates.”130  In view of these statutory provisions, in the event that the 
Law Society decides to terminate or scale back drastically its criminal legal 
aid programs, an argument may be made by an indigent litigant that he or 
she has been denied access to justice due to the breach of the statutory 
obligation by the Law Society.  The problem with this reliance on relator 
actions, however, is that the burden of the government in providing access to 
justice may be perceived to have been unfairly shifted to other 
non-government organizations or bodies.  Hence, the relator action per se is 
not a persuasive and rational procedural technique to enhance access to 
judicial remedies for the poor. 
                                           
126
  Id. at 73.  On the facts, however, there were certain procedural defects relating to the filing of the 
relator’s prior consent to act and hence, the writ was set aside.  Id. 
127
  Id.  See also MALAYSIAN CONST. art. 145(2).  Article 145(2) of the Malaysian Constitution reads: 
“It shall be the duty of the Attorney General to advise the Yang di-Pertuan Agong or the Cabinet or any 
Minister upon such legal matters, and to perform such other duties of a legal character, as may from time to 
time be referred or assigned to him by the Yang di-Pertuan Agong or the Cabinet, and to discharge the 
functions conferred on him by or under this Constitution or any other written law.”  The Yang di-Pertuan 
Agong is the head of the Executive in Malaysia. 
128
  Raja Azlan Shah J. noted: “If the contention of [the defendants’ lawyer] truly represents the law of 
this country, it would be deplorable.  It would mean that the Attorney-General who is the guardian of 
public rights is not competent to bring a relator action to restrain interference with a public right or to abate 
a public nuisance or to compel the performance of a public duty.  Nothing could be more unjust.”  
Attorney-General At And By The Relation Of Pesurohjaya Ibu Kota (Commissioner Of The Federal 
Capital), Kuala Lumpur v. Wan Kam Fong, [1967] 2 Malayan L. J. at 73.   
129
  Legal Profession Act, 2001, c. 161, § 38(f) (Sing.). 
130
  Id. § 38(g). 
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2. Liberal Locus Standi Rules May Be Utilized to Allow the Poor to 
Access the Courts in the Event of Infringements of the Law 
Where relator actions cannot be utilized, the potential applicant would 
have to establish locus standi to commence a court action on behalf of the 
poor or a group of poor persons.  The rationale underlying rules on locus 
standi is that judicial resources and time are limited and need to be 
appropriately allocated to litigants.  Further, the rule seeks to prevent the 
opening of floodgates to litigation, particularly frivolous and vexatious 
claims.131 
The traditional English common law rules of locus standi require:  1) 
some interference with a private right of the applicant in conjunction with 
the infringement of a public right; or 2) where there is no infringement of a 
private right, there must be some special damage suffered by the applicant 
arising from the interference with a public right (as encapsulated in the case 
of Boyce v. Paddington Borough Council132 and endorsed in Gouriet v. 
Union of Post Office Workers133). 
This traditional principle was followed by the majority judges in the 
Malaysian case of Government of Malaysia v. Lim Kit Siang,134 as mentioned 
above, to deny locus standi to the applicant, whether as a politician, a road 
or highway user, or a tax payer.  Hashim Yeop Sani S.C.J., one of the 
majority judges, noted there that if there is a lacuna in the law, the 
legislature, not the courts, should step in to fill the gaps.135  The Court 
reached such a result despite the existence of prior Malaysian decisions136 
extolling the liberal approach to locus standi as well as Abdoolcader S.C.J.’s 
caution137 against the judiciary taking such retrogressive steps and closing 
the door to the ventilation of a public grievance.  It is suggested that this 
strict approach in Lim Kit Siang should be rejected in favor of the more 
liberalized and current approach in England and Singapore. 
                                           
131
  In India, there are explicit judicial pronouncements concerning the need to relax locus standi rules 
in order to allow the poor to have a “voice” in court through their proxies.  S. P. Gupta v. President of 
India, (1982) 69 A.I.R. 149 (India). 
132
  Boyce v. Paddington Borough Council, (1903) 1 Ch. 109 (U.K.). 
133
  Gouriet v. Union of Post Office Workers, (1978) A.C. 435 (U.K.). 
134
  Government of Malaysia v. Lim Kit Siang, [1988] 2 Malayan L. J. 12, 25, 41. 
135
  Id. at 41. 
136
  Tan Sri Haji Othman Saat v. Mohamed bin Ismail, [1982] 2 Malayan L. J. 177; Lim Cho Hock v. 
Government of the State of Perak, [1980] 2 Malayan L. J. 148. 
137
  Government of Malaysia v. Lim Kit Siang, [1988] 2 Malayan L. J. 12, 45. 
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In England, it should be observed that the erstwhile Order 53 of the 
U.K. Supreme Court Rules,138 which enabled a private citizen to apply for 
judicial review on the basis of “a sufficient interest in the matter to which his 
application relates,” had already ushered a more liberalized approach to 
locus standi.139 
In a similar vein, the Singapore Court of Appeal in Chan Hiang Leng 
Colin v. Minister for Information and the Arts140 held that the applicants 
(Jehovah’s Witnesses) had locus standi to apply for certiorari as well as a 
declaration that the order of the Minister of Information and the Arts 
prohibiting certain International Bible Students’ Association publications 
was invalid.141  The Court of Appeal held that the applicants had sufficient 
interest as citizens of Singapore to challenge the order on the grounds of an 
alleged violation of a constitutional provision.142  The Court found that the 
fact that a constitutional violation would affect other citizens does not 
detract from a citizen’s interest to ensure that his own constitutional rights 
are not violated.143  For the applicants to establish sufficient interest in the 
matter, the Court determined that the low threshold test of “prima facie case 
of reasonable suspicion”144 or an “arguable case”145 that the minister had 
acted irrationally would be applicable. 
On the other hand, the Singapore Court of Appeal decision in In Re An 
Advocate and Solicitor ex parte The Law Society of Singapore for Judicial 
Review146 did not involve a constitutional provision but the statutory duty of 
the Law Society of Singapore (“Law Society”) under the Legal Profession 
Act.  In that case, the Law Society sought an order of mandamus against the 
                                           
138
  Note that the United Kingdom has revoked Order 53:  The Civil Procedure (Amendment No. 4) 
Rules 2000, S.I. 2092 L. 16.  The rules for application for judicial review are now contained in Part 54 of 
the Civil Procedure Rules 1998, S.I. 3132 L. 17.  Id. 
139
  See Inland Revenue Commissioners v. National Federation of Self-Employed & Small Business 
Ltd., (1982) A.C. 617 (U.K.). 
140
  Chan Hiang Leng Colin v. Minister for Information and the Arts, [1996] 1 Sing. L. Rep. 609 
(Court of Appeal). 
141
  Id. at 614.  However, the Court of Appeal held that the issues raised by the application pertaining 
to national security are not justiciable.  See id. at 617.   
142
  Id. at 614; See also SING. CONST. art. 15(1) (conferring the right to profess, practice and propagate 
religion). 
143
  Chan Hiang Leng Colin v. Minister for Information and the Arts, [1996] 1 Sing. L. Rep. 609, 614. 
144
  Id. at 616;  see Public Service Commission v. Lai Swee Lin, Linda, [2001] 1 Sing. L. Rep. 644; 
Wong Keng Leong Rayner v. Law Society of Singapore, [2006] 4 Sing. L. Rep. 934, ¶ 77; Teng Fuh 
Holdings Pte. Ltd. v. Collector of Land Revenue, [2007] 2 Sing. L. Rep. 568, ¶¶ 35, 41 (applying the 
holding in the context of an application for leave to apply for order of certiorari and mandamus under Order 
53 of the Rules of Court). 
145
  Chan Hiang Leng Colin v. Minister for Information and the Arts, [1996] 1 Sing. L. Rep. 609, 616. 
146
  In Re An Advocate and Solicitor ex parte The Law Society of Singapore for Judicial Review, 
[1987] 2 Malayan L. J. 21.  
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disciplinary committee (set up under the provisions of the same Act) to 
direct the latter to hear and investigate charges against an advocate and 
solicitor.147  The Court of Appeal determined that the Law Society had 
“sufficient interest” and therefore the locus standi to apply for the 
mandamus as one of the society’s purposes is “to maintain and impose the 
standards of conduct . . . of the legal profession in Singapore” under section 
39 of the Act.148 
Thus, with respect to the legal rights of the poor, the case of Chan 
Hiang Leng Colin would support the bringing of an action in the event of an 
alleged violation of a constitutional right.149  However, if the group of poor 
persons cannot establish a prima facie case of reasonable suspicion or an 
arguable case that their constitutional rights have been violated, it would 
then be difficult, based on Chan Hiang Leng Colin, to surmount the 
procedural obstacle.  There is no broad-based constitutional right of access 
to justice in Singapore and, more specifically, no constitutional right to legal 
aid and legal representation.150  Hence, should a new government decide to 
drastically reduce the legal aid budget so as to deprive a substantial number 
of the poor of the statutory entitlement to legal aid, these indigent litigants 
are unlikely to possess the locus standi to commence the action against the 
new government—such individuals would be hard pressed to establish that a 
specific constitutional provision, namely the constitutional right to legal aid, 
had been violated.  Therefore, the procedural principles of locus standi in 
Chan Hiang Leng Colin could not be invoked by the group of indigent 
litigants claiming entitlement to legal aid where the underlying substratum 
of constitutional jurisprudence is absent. 
However, the indigent litigants would be able to surmount the locus 
standi obstacle if they could establish that “sufficient interest” exists as in In 
Re Advocate & Solicitor, notwithstanding the absence of a constitutional 
infringement.  The courts would not be required to indulge in “a detailed and 
microscopic analysis of the [court] material”151 in determining locus standi 
as long as there is a prima facie case of suspicion of some infringement of 
the law.  Again, the indigent litigant seeking criminal legal aid, for example, 
may wish to rely on the statutory obligation of the Law Society to “make 
provision for or assist in the promotion of a scheme whereby impecunious 
                                           
147
  Id. at 22. 
148
  Id. at 36 (citing the Legal Profession Act, Ch. 161, § 39 (Sing.)). 
149
  Chan Hiang Leng Colin v. Minister for Information and the Arts, [1996] 1 Sing. L. Rep. 609. 
150
  See supra Part II.A. 
151
  See Public Service Commission v. Lai Swee Lin, Linda, [2001] 1 Sing. L. Rep. 644, ¶ 20 (citing 
the grounds of decision of the trial judge). 
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persons on non-capital charges are represented by advocates”152 under the 
Legal Profession Act.  It is suggested that, where there is prima facie 
evidence that the Law Society fails to carry out the statutory functions of 
criminal legal aid for the needy, the indigent litigant should have the locus 
standi to pursue the matter in the courts.  The courts should not curtail such 
an application via a strict interpretation of locus standi rules.  The 
substantive merits of such a case (as to whether a statutory obligation was in 
fact breached and whether remedies were available) should be treated as a 
separate matter from locus standi. 
3. Representative Actions Can Reduce the Financial Burden for Indigent 
Litigants 
The Singapore Rules of Court prescribe that representative 
proceedings may be commenced where numerous persons have the “same 
interest” in the proceedings.153  Such an action is premised upon the 
existence of a common interest and common grievance in which the relief 
sought is beneficial to the representatives.154  This procedure has been 
applied flexibly even to situations where the plaintiff representative does not 
have the consent of all the members of the represented group155 or where the 
plaintiffs comprise opposing factions.156  The procedural mechanism of 
instituting a representative action is not only meant for the poor but 
generally for individual prospective litigants who have to shoulder a huge 
financial burden in order to litigate.  In particular, the mechanism is feasible 
where the claims of each prospective litigant are small compared to the 
potential costs and risks involved.  This financial burden of potential 
litigants (including the poor) can be ameliorated if the claims are aggregated 
via a representative action.  This serves as one avenue for enhancing access 
to justice for the group of indigent litigants who may also wish to share the 
costs in engaging a lawyer. 
In Malaysia, for instance, the representative action was used in the 
case of Jok Jau Evong for the protection of native customary proprietary 
rights based on a statute.157  The defined representative group in that case 
was the Kayan community, a native group that possessed legal rights to the 
                                           
152
  See Legal Profession Act (Cap. 161, 2001 Rev. Ed.), § 38(g). 
153
  Order 15, r 12.  The leading local decision with respect to representative actions is Tan Chin Seng 
v. Raffles Town Club (No 2), [2005] 2 Sing. L. Rep. 302 (involving the suit of 4895 members against the 
town club for misrepresentation and breach of contract). 
154
  See Duke of Bedford v. Ellis, (1901) A.C. 1 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.) (U.K.). 
155
  Abdul Rahim v. Ling How Doong, [1994] 2 Sing. L. Rep. 668, 671. 
156
  Jok Jau Evong v. Marabong Lumber, [1990] 3 Malayan L. J. 427, 433. 
157
  Id. at 432 (citing the Land Code of Sarawak (Cap. 81)). 
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customary land.158  In Singapore, though representative actions have been 
employed, there has not been a specific case involving indigent litigants as a 
group. 
4. The Security for Costs Application by the Defendant Should Not Deny 
Access to Justice for the Plaintiff 
In Singapore, the defendants involved in court litigation may apply for 
security for costs from the plaintiffs pursuant to the Rules of Court based on 
specified grounds.159  The impoverishment of the plaintiff is not specifically 
stated as a ground for making an order for security for costs.160  However, 
one of the specified grounds is that where the plaintiff is a nominal plaintiff, 
the court must assess whether there is “reason to believe that [the plaintiff] 
will be unable to pay the costs to the defendant if ordered to do so.”161  It 
should also be noted that the Rules of Court stipulate that the court making 
the order for security for costs is to have regard to “the circumstances of the 
case” and considerations of justice.162 
Singapore court decisions have expressly noted the significance of 
ensuring justice prior to making such an order.  For example, the Court is 
mindful to ensure that the defendant’s purpose in seeking security for costs 
is not to quell the plaintiff’s quest for justice.163  At the same time, the courts 
are reluctant to “whittle away a natural person’s right to litigate despite 
poverty.”164  Hence, the application for security for costs from the defendant 
cannot be seen to deny the plaintiff access to the Singapore courts.165 
                                           
158
  Jok Jau Evong v. Marabong Lumber, [1990] 3 Malayan L. J. 427, 433. 
159
  Order 23, r 1 stipulates four alternative grounds:  (a) the plaintiff is ordinarily resident outside the 
jurisdiction; (b) the plaintiff is a nominal plaintiff suing for the benefit of another person and there is reason 
to believe that he will be unable to pay the costs of the defendant if ordered to do so; (c) the plaintiff’s 
address is not stated in the writ or other originating process or is incorrectly stated therein; or (d) the 
plaintiff has changed his address during the course of the proceedings with a view to evading the 
consequences of the litigation.  
160
  See Mathi Alegen s/o Gothendaraman v. The Tamils Representative Council Singapore, [2002] 
S.G.H.C. 310, ¶ 21. 
161
  Order 23, r 1(1)(b). 
162
  Order 23, r 1. 
163
  See Pandian Marimuthu v. Guan Leong, [2001] 3 Sing. L. Rep. 400, 403. 
164
  Amar Hoseen Mohammed v. Singapore Airlines Ltd., [1995] 1 Sing. L. Rep. 77, 84 (K.S. Rajah 
J.C.). 
165
  Id. 
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5. The Courts Cannot Order Interim Payments by Impecunious 
Defendants to Plaintiffs in Personal Injury Actions 
Order 29 of the Rules of Court on interim payments166 in Singapore 
provides that in an action for personal injuries, the court must not make an 
order for interim payments if, amongst other criteria, the defendant does not 
have the “means and resources” to make the interim payments.167  This 
serves to ameliorate the financial hardship of the indigent defendant. 
While no Singapore court has reflected directly on interim payments 
by indigent defendants, the English Court of Appeal has interpreted a similar 
rule relating to the means and resources of the indigent defendant.  In the 
English case of British and Commonwealth Holdings v. Quadrex 
Holdings,168 the English Court of Appeal overturned the trial judge’s order 
that the defendant pay the plaintiffs interim payments of 75 million pounds 
under Order 29.  Sir Nicholas Browne Wilkinson V.C. stated that, even in 
non-personal injury cases, “ . . . if a defendant's resources are such that an 
order for interim payment would cause irremediable harm which cannot be 
made good by an eventual repayment, that is a very relevant factor to be 
taken into account in fixing the amount of any interim payment.”169  Hence, 
the Court of Appeal in that case drastically reduced the interim payment sum 
payable by the defendants.170 
6. Streamlining the Litigation Processes and Judicial Case Management 
to Enhance Efficiency Should Not Compromise Substantive Access to 
Justice 
The modus operandi of the Singapore courts is to reduce litigation 
costs and the waiting time for litigants as discussed below.  In this way, 
indigent litigants who are not eligible for legal aid would likely benefit from 
the greater efficiencies of court processes.  As more well-off litigants are 
likely better able to withstand prolonged trials or hearings as compared to 
their indigent counterparts, efficient court processes serve to reduce the 
                                           
166
  Order 29, r 9 of the Rules of Court provides that interim payments, in relation to a defendant, 
means a payment on account of any damages, debt or other sum (excluding costs) which he may be held 
liable to pay to or for the benefit of the plaintiff.  Order 29, r 10 empowers the plaintiff to apply to the 
Court for an order requiring that the defendant make an interim payment. 
167
  Rules of Court, 2006, R.5, Rev. Ed. (Sing.), Order 29, r. 11(2)(b). 
168
  British and Commonwealth Holdings v. Quadrex Holdings, (1989) Q.B. 842 (U.K.). 
169
  Id. at 867. 
170
  Id.  Note that the current U.K. Civil Procedures Rules 1998 (No. 3132 L. 17) do not stipulate the 
above-mentioned criterion relating to the “means and resources” of the defendant to make the interim 
payment, unlike the Rules of Court applicable to Singapore. 
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inequality gap.  The improved efficiency of courts through more streamlined 
procedures and case management, ceteris paribus, is likely to reduce 
economic costs for the litigants as a whole, not to mention the anxiety and 
worries that can arise from undue delays in the judicial process.  In criminal 
cases, inefficiency can further translate into loss of liberty if the accused is 
kept in remand for an unnecessarily long period pending trial.  In addition, 
where a long time-lag exists between the events which give rise to the court 
action and the trial, there is a greater tendency for errors to multiply.  
However, although speed and efficiency of the court processes are 
important, they should not be over-emphasized such that the capacity of 
lawyers and litigants in person to understand and adequately prepare for 
their cases is compromised. 
One important measure undertaken by the Singapore judiciary is the 
streamlining of litigation processes to facilitate access to justice. Prior to the 
reforms of the 1990s, the pace of litigation was virtually dictated by the 
parties, rather than the courts.171  As an important feature of the departure 
from the party-controlled litigation process, Singapore introduced the 
proactive, court-initiated and court-directed procedure pursuant to Order 
34A of the Rules of Court for “just, expeditious and economical disposal” in 
the Subordinate Courts in 1994172 and the High Court in 1996 
respectively.173  This judicial formula for efficiency is also applied to the 
stage of summons for directions in trial preparation.174  In addition, since 
2001, the rule of automatic discontinuance was applied to cases that have 
been inactive for the duration of the preceding twelve months.175 
With respect to manpower management in criminal cases, Singapore 
reduced the number of judges in capital trials from two to one since April 
1992 in order to double the rate of disposal of cases and thus significantly 
shortened the remand period before trial.176  Another measure involved the 
transferring of cases from the High Court judge to the registrars in 
bankruptcy petitions, family law disputes, and proceedings of the 
quasi-judicial tribunals such as the Copyright Tribunal, the Tenants’ 
                                           
171
  See PINSLER, CIVIL JUSTICE IN SINGAPORE, supra note 68, at 94. 
172
  Subordinate Courts (Amendment) Rules 1994 (S260/94). 
173
  Rules of Court 1996 (S71/96) (Sing.) (on file with the Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal). 
174
  Rules of Court, 2006, R.5, Rev. Ed. (Sing.), Order 25, r. 1(b). 
175
  See The Honourable Chan Sek Keong, Chief Justice of Singapore, Speech at the 12th Conference 
of Chief Justices of Asia and the Pacific: Overcoming Backlogs, ¶ 58 (June 4, 2007) (transcript available at 
http://app.supremecourt.gov.sg/data/doc/ManagePage/2022/HK%20Conference%20_CJ%20speech.pdf) 
[hereinafter Overcoming Backlogs]. 
176
  See Singapore Supreme Court, SUPREME COURT SINGAPORE: THE RE-ORGANISATION OF THE 
1990S 48 (1994). 
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Compensation Board, and the Income Tax Board of Review.177  Furthermore, 
the recent enactment of the Subordinate Courts (Amendment) Act in 2005178 
allows greater flexibility in transferring cases from the Subordinate Courts to 
the High Court and vice versa to improve efficiency.  
The Singapore judiciary also simplified the litigation processes.179  
The Rules of the Supreme Court and Subordinate Courts were merged to 
form a single set of rules in 1996.180  In addition, recent changes have been 
implemented to streamline processes by reducing the four modes of 
commencement of proceedings to two (namely, the writ of summons and 
originating summons)181 and by simplifying certain Latin or archaic legal 
terms previously in use.182  
Further, with respect to streamlining the litigation process in terms of 
targeting outcomes and monitoring, the Singapore Supreme Court has 
cleared an extensive backlog of cases since the 1990s.183  Waiting periods for 
cases to be heard are now considerably shorter than in the past.184  Indeed, 
these specific waiting periods are not merely part of a wish list but are 
“concretized” in the Supreme Court Practice Directions 2006.185  Now in 
Singapore, the speed at which the cases are heard and disposed of is fairly 
phenomenal.  In 2005, the average disposal time for writs was less than 
seven months with more than 50% of the writs filed concluded in less than 
six months.186  The Singapore judiciary has continued to set lofty standards 
and targets for the disposal of cases.187 
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  Id. at 44. 
178
  Subordinate Courts Act, ch. 321 (Act 26 of 2005 – Subordinate Courts Act (Amendment) Act 26) 
(Sing.). 
179
  See The Honourable Yong Pung How, Chief Justice of Singapore, Chief Justice Yong Pung 
How’s Speech, Opening of the Legal Year 2006 (Jan. 7, 2006), ¶¶ 5, 6 (transcript available at 
http://app.supremecourt.gov.sg/default.aspx?pgID=921) [hereinafter Chief Justice’s Speech 2006]. 
180
  The Rules of Court 1996 went into effect on April 1, 1996.  At the same time, the Rules of the 
Subordinate Courts (1993 Edition) and the Rules of the Supreme Court (1990 Edition) were repealed.  See 
Rules of Court 1996 (S71/96) (on file with the Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal). 
181
  See Statutes (Miscellaneous Amendments) (No. 2) Act 2005; Rules of Court (Amendment No. 3) 
Rules; see also The Supreme Court Practice Directions (Practice Direction No. 12 of 2005) and the 
Registrar’s Circulars No. 5 of 2005, http://app.supremecourt.gov.sg/default.aspx?pgID=98. 
182
  The following legal terms have been substituted by new terms contained in parentheses: 
mandamus (mandatory order); prohibition (prohibiting order); certiorari (quashing order) and habeas 
corpus (order for review of detention).  See Statutes (Miscellaneous Amendments) (No. 2) Act 2005 (Act 
42 of 2005) (adding a new section 41B to the Interpretation Act (Cap. 1, 2002 Rev. Ed.)). 
183
  See Chief Justice, Singapore Supreme Court, Response By The Honourable The Chief Justice: 
Opening of the Legal Year 1999 (Jan. 9, 1999), ¶¶ 5-7, 37, 38 (transcript available at 
http://app.supremecourt.gov.sg/default.aspx?pgID=538). 
184
  See CIVIL JUSTICE IN SINGAPORE, supra note 68, at 98. 
185
  See Rules of Court, 2006, R.5, Rev. Ed. (Sing.), app. B. 
186
  See Chief Justice’s Speech 2006, supra note 179, ¶ 20. 
187
  The targets comprise the disposal of at least 85% of the writ actions within eighteen months of 
filing and the fixing of trial dates within eight weeks of setting down.  See The Honourable Chan Sek 
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Aiding in the efficient disposal of cases, the Differentiated Case 
Management Scheme of the Singapore judiciary assigns cases to different 
management tracks (standard, express, and complex).188  Each track has a 
different timeline for disposing of cases and the progress of the cases is 
subject to regular monitoring.189  There is also a differentiated track for 
complex civil claims above S$150,000 at the Subordinate Courts.190  The 
group management scheme in the Subordinate Courts ensures that the group 
managers (district judges) are each responsible for distributing and 
monitoring the cases heard by the other judges within their group.191  
Despite the Singapore judiciary’s progress in this arena, it is important 
to note that over-efficiency of the judicial system may put great demands on 
the time and resources of law firms and lawyers,192 potentially affecting the 
quality of legal services provided.193  This also applies to litigants in person 
in the preparation of the case, discussed more fully in Part II.C below.  It is 
important that the speed and efficiency of the litigation process should not 
supplant substantive justice.194  To reiterate the words of Justice Andrew 
Phang (cited above):  “The quest for justice, therefore, entails a continuous 
need to balance the procedural with the substantive.  More than that, it is a 
continuous attempt to ensure that both are integrated, as far as that is 
humanly possible.  Both interact with each other.”195  In this regard, the 
adversarial process has an important role to play in ensuring that all material 
evidence, facts and legal arguments are put before the judges concerned.  If 
lawyers and litigants encounter problems in ensuring adequate preparation 
                                                                                                                              
Keong, Chief Justice of Singapore, Response By The Honourable The Chief Justice Chan Sek Keong: 
Opening of the Legal Year 2007 (Jan. 6, 2007) ¶¶ 3-5 (transcript available at 
http://app.supremecourt.gov.sg/default.aspx?pgID=67) [hereinafter Response by Chief Justice Chan 2007].  
188
  See Abigail Ng & Eric Tin, Leading Change in the Singapore’s Magistracy: The Seven Working 
Precepts (unpublished paper presented at the inaugural AIJA Magistrates’ Conference, Melbourne, July 20-
21, 2001), ¶ 12, available at http://www.aija.org.au/Mag01/Singapore.pdf. 
189
  See Waleed Haider Malik, JUDICIARY-LED REFORMS IN SINGAPORE: FRAMEWORK, STRATEGIES, 
AND LESSONS 76 (The World Bank, 2007). 
190
  See SUBORDINATE COURTS ANNUAL REPORT 2005, supra note 49, at 5-6. 
191
  Mavis Chionh, The Development of the Court System, in ESSAYS IN SINGAPORE LEGAL HISTORY 
118 (Kevin Y. L. Tan ed., 2005). 
192
  The pace of litigation ranked fifth (out of twelve categories, the last being the residual category of 
“Others”) in terms of the reasons for lawyers who ceased practice in Singapore from 1999 to 2001.  
CENSUS 2001, supra note 21, at 154, 185.  
193
  One senior lawyer was quoted as stating, “Justice delayed may be justice denied.  But justice 
hurried is justice buried.  You can’t expect cuisine quality under fast food conditions . . . .”  Ong Soh Chin, 
Singapore Lawyers – Up Close With ‘A Most Naughty Profession’, STRAITS TIMES, Feb. 13, 2006. 
194
  See CIVIL JUSTICE IN SINGAPORE, supra note 68, at 141. 
195
  United Overseas Bank Limited v. Ng Huat Foundations Pte. Ltd., [2005] 2 Sing. L. Rep. 425, ¶ 8. 
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for hearings,196 there is a danger that the judge (and, for that matter, justice) 
may be compromised due to the absence of proper evidence and legal 
arguments.  This important issue was emphatically addressed by the present 
Chief Justice who stated recently that “[n]o litigant should be allowed to 
leave the courtroom with the conviction or feeling that he has not been given 
a fair hearing.”197  Indeed, in the most recent Subordinate Courts Workplan, 
the Chief Justice has highlighted the need to broaden and deepen the 
development of the “law, practice and jurisprudence” of Singapore.198 
From the perspective of this second procedural approach, the 
prognosis is generally positive in Singapore.  While relator actions are not 
practical to vindicate the rights of the poor to access justice, locus standi 
rules are sufficiently liberal in Singapore, even in the absence of a 
constitutional right of access to justice.  Representative actions may be used 
to reduce legal costs for each indigent litigant by pooling resources.  With 
respect to applications for security for costs, there have been several positive 
statements by judges emphasizing the significance of access to justice in 
determining the outcomes of such applications.  Indigent defendants may 
also be protected via court orders refusing to grant interim payments to 
plaintiffs.  While procedural efficiencies of the judicial processes have 
reduced costs and delays for litigants as a whole, care must be taken not to 
allow such efficiency to supplant substantive justice for individual litigants. 
C. Institutional Measures Have, to a Large Extent, Enhanced Access to 
Justice for the Poor 
The institutional (or organizational) approach examines fairly 
large-scale reforms of the Singapore judicial system in recent years.  These 
reforms may involve economic measures as well as the types of procedural 
measures discussed in Parts II.A and II.B above.  Indeed, the three 
approaches interact and overlap to a considerable extent.  In this Section, the 
work of small claims tribunals, court technology, court mediations as well as 
                                           
196
  It was reported that a survey of more than 100 law firms revealed that 70% of them faced 
problems preparing for civil court hearings that were brought forward.  See Blochlinger, supra note 48, at 
613 (citing Tan Ooi Boon, Early Trial Dates “Not a Problem,” STRAITS TIMES, Jan. 18, 1999). 
197
  See The Honourable Chan Sek Keong, Chief Justice of Singapore, Keynote Address:  Justice @ 
The Subordinate Courts: The New Phases of Justice, 15th Subordinate Courts Workplan 2006/2007, ¶  27 
(May 18, 2006), available at http://app.subcourts.gov.sg//subcourts/page.aspx?pageid=34949 (last visited 
Sept. 3, 2007). 
198
  See The Honourable Chan Sek Keong, Chief Justice of Singapore, Keynote Address:  Justice @ 
The Subordinate Courts: The Next Phase, 16th Subordinate Courts Workplan 2007/2008, ¶ 5 (Apr. 27, 
2007), (transcript available at http://app.supremecourt.gov.sg/default.aspx?pgID=2021) [hereinafter 
Keynote Address 2007]. 
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legal aid provision, pro bono work, and the judicial perspectives towards 
litigants in person will be discussed. 
1. Small Claims Tribunals Provide Cost-Effective Access to the Courts 
The aim of the Small Claims Tribunals Act199 was to reduce costs and 
delays in Singapore and to that end, enhance access to justice for litigants 
with limited means.  In this respect, the fees for lodging a claim at the Small 
Claims Tribunals (“SCTs”) are maintained at a relatively low level.200  
Further, the lodging of claims via the use of electronic forms can be 
accomplished expeditiously at SCTs.201  In fact, the Honorable Chief Justice 
has indicated that, in the near future, the enforcement of SCT orders, 
currently enforceable as Magistrates’ orders, will be even further 
simplified.202 
With respect to possible criticism that the potential for SCTs in 
enhancing access to justice for the poor litigant is limited by the jurisdiction 
stated in the SCT legislation, the fact is that since SCTs were first 
established, the cause of action jurisdiction has been increased.  Initially, the 
SCTs had jurisdiction over claims such as disputes with respect to the sale of 
goods and provision of services.203  Subsequently, tort claims resulting in 
property damage (excluding those arising from motor accidents)204 and more 
recently, claims relating to disputes arising from any contract for the lease of 
residential premises not exceeding two years, were added to the list.205  The 
monetary limits on the jurisdiction of the SCTs have also increased 
                                           
199
  Small Claims Tribunals Act, ch. 308 (1998 Rev. Ed.) (Sing.) (This Act was most recently 
amended in 2005), available at http://statutes.agc.gov.sg/ (search “308” in the “Go to Cap. No.” box; then 
follow the “Small Claims Tribunals Act” hyperlink). 
200
  The fee is S$10 for claim amounts up to S$5000, S$20 for claim amounts beyond S$5000 but 
below S$10,000.  Where the claim is beyond S$10,000 but not exceeding S$20,000, the lodgment fee is 1% 
of the claim amount.  See The Singapore Subordinate Courts, SUBORDINATE COURTS ANNUAL REPORT: 
THE NEW PHASES OF JUSTICE 42-43 (2006), available at 
http://app.subcourts.gov.sg/subcourts/page.aspx?pageid=4469 [hereafter SUBORDINATE COURTS ANNUAL 
REPORT 2006]. 
201
  This is in the form of a downloadable do-it-yourself kit for court users.  See Subordinate Courts of 
Singapore, Our Do-It-Yourself Kit, http://app.subcourts.gov.sg/sct/index.aspx (last visited Sept. 3, 2007). 
202
  SCT orders are currently enforced as Magistrates’ Orders which are more onerous.  See Keynote 
Address 2007, supra note 198, ¶ 35. 
203
  Small Claims Tribunals Act, ch. 308 (Act 27 of 1984 - Small Claims Tribunals Act 1984) (Sing.) 
The original enactment of this Act was in 1984. 
204
  Small Claims Tribunals, ch. 308 (Act 17 of 1995 - Small Claims Tribunals (Amendment) Act 
1995) (Sing.).  The 1995 amendments were the second revisions to the Act following its original 
enactment. 
205
  Small Claims Tribunals, ch. 308 (Act 43 of 2005 - Small Claims Tribunals (Amendment) Act 
2005) (Sing.).  The 2005 amendments are the most recent revisions to the Act and came into operation on 
February 15, 2006. 
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significantly in Singapore since the SCTs’ establishment in 1984, from a 
mere S$2000206 to S$10,000 (and where parties consent, up to a maximum 
amount of S$20,000).207  Such expansion of the SCTs’ jurisdiction enables 
greater use of these tribunals as a cheaper and more user-friendly alternative 
forum to the civil courts.  
As part of the Singapore judiciary’s initiatives to enhance access to 
justice for the poor, in order to reduce the financial risks borne by litigants, 
SCTs are not allowed to award costs to the victorious party, only 
disbursements.208  Moreover, once a claim has been lodged with SCTs, the 
plaintiff is generally foreclosed from bringing an action in the civil courts,209 
where the costs are likely to be higher. 
One significant feature of SCTs is that no legal representation is 
allowed.210  Whether the absence of legal representation might work to the 
relative detriment of the poor as against more well-off litigants depends, to a 
large extent, on the referee hearing the case.  In particular, it depends on 
whether the referee would be proactive in ensuring that an indigent litigant is 
not unfairly prejudiced in a hearing against, for example, a large corporate 
body.  According to a 1999 public survey, 98% of respondents agreed or 
strongly agreed that SCTs provide a low-cost forum for resolving small 
claims.211  Notwithstanding such public sentiment, the Singapore judiciary 
continues to implement measures seeking to “equalize” this apparent 
asymmetry in litigation resources between litigants. For instance, the 
Subordinate Courts have recently provided user-friendly do-it-yourself 
(“DIY”) kits on the process of SCTs to guide litigants through the judicial 
process.212  To encourage public discourse on the subject, the Subordinate 
Courts also organized public talks on the work of the SCTs.213 
The informal setting of a SCT proceeding is likely, as a whole, to 
promote greater access to justice for indigent litigants.  The SCT processes 
enable the amicable settlement of disputes before the referee hears the 
                                           
206
  Small Claims Tribunals Act, ch. 308 (Act 27 of 1984 - Small Claims Tribunals Act 1984) (Sing.). 
207
  Small Claims Tribunals (Jurisdiction) Order (1997) (S. 321/97). 
208
  Small Claims Tribunals Act, ch. 308, § 31 (Act 27 of 1984 - Small Claims Tribunals Act 1984) 
(Sing.). 
209
  Id. § 6. 
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  Id. § 23(3). 
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  See Survey On Public Attitudes and Perceptions of the Singapore Subordinate Courts, 23 RES. 
BULL. 5 (Subordinate Courts of Singapore), Dec. 1999, http://app.subcourts.gov.sg/Data/Files/File/ 
Research/rb23.pdf [hereinafter Survey on Public Attitudes and Perceptions 1999]. 
212
  See Subordinate Courts of Singapore, DIY Kit, available at http://app.subcourts.gov.sg/ 
sct/page.aspx?pageid=3946 (last visited Sept. 3, 2007). 
213
 See SUBORDINATE COURTS ANNUAL REPORTS 2006, supra note 200, at 43. 
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evidence and decides the case based on its merits.214  Also relevant, the 
referee in a SCT proceeding is not required to resort to strict legal forms, 
technicalities, or rules of evidence.215  Bearing in mind that specific studies 
conducted appeared to show a general positive correlation between the level 
of education, income, and wealth in Singapore,216 this absence of the 
requirement for formality and technical rules would, ceteris paribus, 
presumably enable poorer litigants without legal representation greater (or 
more equal) access to justice at SCTs. 
In the initial years of establishing SCTs, the main users were corporate 
bodies to collect debts for unpaid goods and services.217  The jurisdiction of 
the SCTs explicitly included claims in respect of fees and levies owed to 
certain statutory bodies.218  One commentator expressed concern that 
consumers as a group might be sidelined and proposed a limitation on the 
number of claims filed by corporate bodies.219  However, as noted by 
another commentator, the use of SCTs by corporate bodies for debt 
collection does not necessarily hinder access to justice for individual 
litigants (including the financially strapped) as long as the caseload is 
properly managed by SCTs.220  
One of the possible criticisms of the SCTs’ process that might bear on 
access to justice for the poor is that appeal rights for litigants are restricted.  
A right to appeal against the referee’s decision to a higher court is not 
automatic.221  It exists only where there is a question of law or if the dispute 
is beyond the jurisdiction of the SCTs.222  In addition, the leave of the district 
court is required before an appeal may be taken.223  This current restriction 
on the right of appeal is arguably in line with the aim of reducing litigation 
costs, namely, “to promote finality, and to avoid high costs in appealing that 
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  However, the referee would not have the benefit of professionally prepared legal arguments and 
research of counsel. 
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  Small Claims Tribunals Act, ch. 308, § 22 (1998 Rev. Ed.) (Sing.), available at 
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  Town Councils Act, ch. 329A, §§ 24H, 51 (2000 Rev. Ed.) (conservancy and service charges 
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Rev. Ed.). 
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Tribunals Act” hyperlink). 
222
  Id. 
223
  Id. 
JUNE 2008 SINGAPORE ACCESS TO JUSTICE 629 
 
  
may exceed in fact the sums in dispute . . . .”224  A blanket right to appeal 
from the decisions of the referee at SCTs could result in increased costs, 
which the poor litigant can ill-afford. 
Apart from SCTs, there are other avenues for resolving small claims 
which are relevant to the promotion of access to justice.  One recent 
initiative has been the introduction of a new Expedited Claims Track for 
claims below S$20,000.225  These comprise debt claims, non-injury motor 
accident claims and claims for damages by victims of crime after the 
accused has been convicted.226  The Honourable Chief Justice envisaged 
that, in the near future, non-injury motor accident cases below S$1000 will 
be first heard by the Financial Industry Disputes Resolution Centre Ltd., 
before the commencement of proceedings at the Subordinate Courts.227  The 
objective is to provide a “quick and affordable avenue for consumers who do 
not have the resources to go to court or who do not want to incur legal fees” 
and where no legal representation is allowed.228   
2. The Use of Technology in the Courts Has, to a Large Extent, Improved 
Access to Justice for the Poor 
To combat the problem of the poor suffering from “poverty of 
information,”229 the courts have undertaken programs to promote legal 
literacy and training for members of the public through the use of 
technology.  The advent of the internet enabled the dissemination of useful 
information about court services to the public.  In this regard, the Singapore 
judiciary has utilized technology for public education purposes.  The 
Subordinate Courts' e@dr website, for instance, provides public information 
on the appropriate dispute resolution forum, legal aid, and free services by 
the courts and volunteers.230  Websites of various subordinate courts, such as 
the family court231 and the juvenile court,232 also provide public access to 
case law and law articles.  More recently, the newly released court 
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230
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231
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index.aspx (last visited Sept. 3, 2007). 
232
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index.aspx (last visited Sept. 3, 2007). 
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judgments have been posted on the websites of the Subordinate Courts233 
and Supreme Court234 for easy public access.  The Chief Justice has also 
announced that the Multi-Door Courthouse Justice Connect Information 
Centre will eventually assist litigants in person with court-related 
information.235 
A substantial majority of Singaporeans have access to the internet at 
home, and the level of internet access is increasing.236  Although some 
disparity exists in access to technology between high and low-income 
groups,237 a large percentage of the low-income group is nevertheless able to 
access the internet and thus court-related information online.238  
Within the Singapore judiciary, the various forms of technology such 
as videolink, computer-aided presentations, web-based filing for small 
claims tribunals and the electronic filing of court documents have been 
utilized to enhance efficiency in the courts.239  Recently, a pilot project 
known as “E-PTC,” which allows pre-trial conferences to be conducted by 
email, was launched.240  The Applications and Cases E-Management System 
is being planned to allow for electronic monitoring of cases against the 
timelines set by the courts.241  When implemented, this is expected to 
obviate the necessity of conducting pre-trial conferences if the parties have 
already complied with the stipulated timelines.242 
The relationship between the use of technology and access to justice 
for the poor in Singapore raises the issue of whether computer-aided 
presentations privilege the well-off at the expense of the indigent litigant.  
First, it may be argued that computer aids are not evidence per se but merely 
serve as explanatory tools of the evidence adduced.  Further, judges, as both 
triers of law and fact, should be capable of assessing the prejudicial effect of 
the material presented and disallow such materials if necessary.243  As an 
additional safeguard, the person who prepared the demonstrative evidence 
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may be called to testify and be available for cross-examination as to the 
accuracy of the material.244  In this regard, there are sufficient safeguards to 
ensure that the greater affordability of and accessibility to computer aids in 
the courtroom for the well-off would not unfairly prejudice litigants with 
limited means. 
It should, however, be observed that the use of technology in the 
courts comes at a cost to litigants.  The Electronic Filing System (“EFS”), 
initiated in 1997, enables the electronic filing and service of court 
documents245 from the offices of law firms as well as the speedy transfer of 
files and electronic research.  According to the Census of the Legal Industry 
and Profession, a majority of the lawyers and law firms surveyed in 2000 
indicated that the EFS had in fact increased the overall costs to prepare and 
file court documents.246  Further, pursuant to the Rules of Court, fees must 
be paid for the use of a technology court, its facilities, and the use and 
preparation of the computer presentation system.247  The Supreme Court 
Practice Directions 2006 also stipulated fees for the use of specific court 
technology.248 
Notwithstanding the above, the EFS is unlikely to prejudice the 
indigent litigant.  This is because efforts have been undertaken by the 
Singapore Judiciary to reduce or waive fees for the use of technology.  With 
respect to filing of court documents via EFS, indigent litigants can apply for 
the waiver or deferral249 of EFS fees and charges.250  EFS is in the process of 
transitioning into the Electronic Litigation Systems (“ELS”), which seeks to 
integrate the use of technology in the litigation process.251  Although the 
focus of the ELS is to facilitate the disposal of cases via the use of 
technology, the EFS Review Implementation Committee, established in 
August 2003, recognized that for litigants in person, ELS should 
                                           
244
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nevertheless allow filing of paper documents.252  In this regard, it added that 
the service bureau can provide services to litigants in person for a 
“reasonable fee.”253 
3. Court-Based Mediation as an Alternative to Costly Litigation and the 
Problem of Unequal Bargaining Power of Disputants 
The aims of the Alternative Dispute Resolution (“ADR”) movement 
in Singapore are generally to improve efficiency and reduce costs in the 
litigation processes as well as to promote less confrontational methods to 
dispute resolution.254  Former Chief Justice Yong warned of the “intolerable” 
costs of dispute resolution and observed that ADR should help litigants to 
“resolve their conflicts fairly, at an affordable cost, and with due 
dispatch.”255  The purpose of ADR is not to enhance access to justice for the 
poor alone, though the poor would be beneficiaries if the ADR mechanisms 
are implemented properly.  
This Section focuses on one significant aspect of ADR, namely court-
based mediation.  For the purposes of this Article, the term “court-based 
mediation” refers to mediation that takes places in the courts after court 
proceedings have been initiated but before the matter proceeds to trial.256  
The mediation process serves as an alternative to full-fledged litigation that 
may be costly and time-consuming,257 with the concomitant positive effects 
of access to justice for poorer litigants.  
Court-based mediation is a significant feature of the Singapore 
judicial landscape.  The e@dr Centre258 of the Subordinate Courts supervises 
the use of mediation in civil cases.  The Settlement Conference is presided 
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of the Singapore Mediation Centre (Aug. 16, 1997), http://www.mediation.com.sg/speech_1.htm (last 
visited Mar. 1, 2008) (emphasis added). 
256
  Court-based mediation, as defined, excludes referrals by the courts to mediation conducted by 
bodies or institutions outside of the Singapore judiciary.  For example, in criminal cases, a Magistrate of 
the Subordinate Courts is empowered to refer a private complaint to a mediator of the Community 
Mediation Centers for mediation.  Community Mediation Centers Act, ch. 49(A), § 15 (1998).  This is not 
court-based mediation for purposes of this Article.  Court-based mediation also excludes mediation 
provided by government agencies and tribunals outside the Singapore Judiciary such as the Tribunal for the 
Maintenance of Parents.  Maintenance of Parents Act, ch. 167(B), § 5(6) (1996). 
257
  LIM LAN YUAN & LIEW THIAM LENG, COURT MEDIATION IN SINGAPORE 50 (1997). 
258
  The e@dr Centre was formerly known as the Court Mediation Centre when it first began in 1994 
and was renamed as the Primary Dispute Resolution Centre in 1998.  It was subsequently renamed as the 
e@dr Centre in 2000.  See Lock Han Chng Jonathan v. Goh Jessiline, [2007] 3 Sing. L. Rep. 51, ¶ 16. 
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over by a settlement judge who is expected to take a proactive mediation 
role in examining and suggesting possible solutions to the parties.259  The 
family court, which is statutorily empowered to refer disputing parties, with 
their consent, to mediation,260 provides in-house mediation and counseling 
services free of charge.  One of the factors used by the family court in 
determining whether a case should proceed for maintenance mediation is the 
need to save litigation costs.261  The recently-established Family Relations 
Centre of the family court has achieved a high rate of successfully mediated 
cases.262  In addition, the Registrar of the small claims tribunals is obliged to 
invite disputing parties for consultation “with a view to effecting a 
settlement acceptable to all the parties.”263  
For purposes of this Article, a relevant consideration is whether 
court-based mediation removes or reduces the inequality of resources of two 
litigants.  First, mediation provides a less costly and faster method of 
resolving disputes.264  Litigants are not charged hearing fees by the court for 
settlement conferences.265  As noted above, the family court in-house 
mediation is free of charge.  Second, mediation provides an informal and 
flexible process which is relatively more conducive for the litigant in person 
as compared to the traditional adversarial process. For litigants with legal 
representation, the courts’ practice is to require lawyers to inform and advise 
clients of the option of using mediation.266  Notably, the settlement rate for 
civil cases commenced in the Subordinate Courts has been extremely 
high.267 
                                           
259
  See Subordinate Courts of Singapore: Court Dispute Resolution, 
http://app.subcourts.gov.sg/subcourts/page.aspx?pageid=4419 (last visited Feb. 29, 2008). 
260
 See Women’s Charter, ch. 353, § 50(1) (1997). 
261
  Marvin Bay, Shobha G. Nair & Asanthi Mendis, The Integration of Alternative Dispute Resolution 
Within the Subordinate Courts’ Adjudication Process, 16 SING. ACAD. L. J. 501, 503 (2004). 
262
  See Overcoming Backlogs, supra note 175, ¶ 64 (noting that 88% of the 1150 mediated cases at 
the Family Relations Centre reached settlement in 2006). 
263
  Small Claims Tribunals Act, ch. 308, § 17(1) (1998 Rev. Ed.) (Sing.), available at 
http://statutes.agc.gov.sg/ (search “308” in the “Go to Cap. No.” box; then follow the “Small Claims 
Tribunal Act” hyperlink). 
264
  See 79 SINGAPORE PARLIAMENTARY REPORTS: ESTIMATES OF EXPENDITURE FOR THE FINANCIAL 
YEAR 1ST APRIL 2005 TO 31ST MARCH 2006, col. 1314 (Mar. 3, 2005). 
265
  See Subordinate Courts of Singapore: Court Dispute Resolution International (CDRI), 
http://app.subcourts.gov.sg/civil/faqs_print.aspx?pageid=8170 (last visited Sept. 3, 2007).  
266
  See SUBORDINATE COURTS PRACTICE DIRECTIONS, at 64-65, (2006 ed.), available at 
http://app.subcourts.gov.sg/Data/Files/File/PracticeDirections/Master%20PD.pdf.  
267
  See 79 SINGAPORE PARLIAMENTARY REPORTS: ESTIMATES OF EXPENDITURE FOR THE FINANCIAL 
YEAR 1ST APRIL 2005 TO 31ST MARCH 2006, col. 1314 (Mar. 3, 2005) (stating that between 1994 and 2004, 
some 48,300 civil matters in the Subordinate Courts were mediated with an average settlement rate of over 
94%). 
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However, difficulties arise with respect to litigants of markedly 
different bargaining power.  Professor Fiss of Yale Law School cautions 
about the informational asymmetry of the economically poor, this group’s 
greater inducement to settle to obtain payments, and its lack of resources to 
finance litigation which can adversely skew the settlement outcome.268  
Another commentator noted that mediation is generally not suitable in a case 
of great power inequality, as the stronger party lacks the incentive to 
compromise.269  It is also plausible for inequity in financial power to be 
manifested in other forms, which can skew the settlement process, such as 
inequalities in literacy level and education.  The above does not mean that it 
is impossible to find a mediated resolution between parties with vast 
disparities in financial prowess, but it does suggest that it might be more 
difficult to achieve appropriate mediated solutions. 
Even in a case where there is no chasm in the parties’ relative power, 
there are potential problems in ensuring that the parties’ settlement have 
been reached voluntarily and based on the proper evidence and facts.  
Although control mechanisms within the judicial process guard against 
coercion of parties by the judge to settle without first hearing the evidence, 
as occurred in the English Court of Appeal decision of Re R (A Minor),270 
this ultimately depends on whether litigants, particularly those who are not 
legally represented, are aware that the judicial conduct in question was 
improper. 
Apart from questions about the effectiveness of court-based mediation 
for vulnerable parties (including those with limited means), the legal status 
of orders emanating from settlements brokered by a judge-mediator may 
also be uncertain.  Such questions arose recently in relation to the status of 
the court orders of the settlement judges at the e@dr Centre.  In Lock Han 
Chng Jonathan v. Goh Jessiline,271 the Singapore High Court determined 
that the e@dr Centre was not a Subordinate Court vested with judicial power 
and instead was merely part of the organization of the Subordinate Courts.272  
                                           
268
  See Richard L. Abel, The Politics of Informal Justice, Volume 1: The American Experience, cited 
in DISPUTE PROCESSES: ADR AND THE PRIMARY FORMS OF DECISION-MAKING 56, 58 (Michael Palmer & 
Simon Roberts eds., 2005). 
269
  See LIM LAN YUAN & LIEW THIAM LENG, supra note 257, at 62. 
270
  Re R, (A Minor) (1995) 1 W.L.R. 184, 191 (A.C.) (U.K.) (determining that a previous consent 
order, arrived at by the parties (who were legally represented) after a settlement, should be set aside and 
ordering a retrial).  The decision cautioned that “great care must be taken not to exert improper or undue 
pressure on a party to settle when he or she is unwilling to do so.  In particular, the judge must take great 
care not to give the impression that he has decided the issue without hearing the evidence and argument 
upon it finally and for all time.”  Id. 
271
  Lock Han Chng Jonathan v. Goh Jessiline, [2007] 3 Sing. L. Rep. 51. 
272
  Id. ¶ 18. 
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Thus, the Centre does not possess the requisite jurisdiction to make orders of 
court.273  According to the decision, the settlement judge at the e@dr Centre 
is only entitled to record the settlement reached by parties and, as such, the 
parties must appear before a judicial officer of the Subordinate Courts to 
convert the recorded settlement into a court order.274  Consistent with the 
High Court decision, the Subordinate Courts issued a circular in May 2007 
to effect the procedure for the recording of consent judgments or orders.275  
However, the Singapore Court of Appeal subsequently reversed the High 
Court decision in October 2007 and stated that the Centre has the power to 
make court orders.276  Detailed grounds of the decision are still pending from 
the Court of Appeal, but the Subordinate Courts have already revoked the 
above-mentioned circular.277  Although the wheel seems to have turned a full 
circle, this episode has, subject to further clarification from the Court of 
Appeal, raised some doubts about the legal status of the orders arising from 
settlements made at the Subordinate Courts. 
4. The Singapore Judiciary Assists in Extending and Promoting the 
Provision of Legal Aid and Pro Bono Services and Takes Steps to 
Enhance Access to Justice for Litigants in Person 
This Section examines the work of government organs, private 
organizations and the judiciary in providing legal aid to litigants with limited 
means.  Insofar as legal aid refers to the provision of legal assistance and 
advice by lawyers, it is expected that the bulk of the legal aid burden would 
fall on the shoulders of the state legal aid bodies and/or private lawyers, not 
judges.  Judges, by virtue of their role as impartial arbiters and bearing in 
mind the potential perils arising from real or perceived conflicts of interests, 
are not expected to provide direct legal advice and assistance to litigants, 
particularly in an adversarial litigation system such as Singapore’s. 
However, the judiciary can play a more indirect role in legal aid provision, 
pro bono work, and in providing assistance to litigants.  The Singapore 
judiciary has taken positive steps in this regard but more can be done to 
enhance access to justice for litigants. 
                                           
273
  Id. ¶ 19. 
274
  Id. ¶ 28. 
275
  See SUBORDINATE COURTS, REGISTRAR’S CIRCULAR, No. 1 (2007). 
276
  See Wong Mun Wai, Teacher Wins Appeal Against Insurer Over Legal Costs, CHANNEL 
NEWSASIA, Oct. 3, 2007, available at http://www.channelnewsasia.com/stories/singaporelocalnews/ 
view/303590/1/.html. 
277
  See SUBORDINATE COURTS, REGISTRAR’S CIRCULAR, No. 2 (2007). 
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a. The Singapore Judiciary’s Roles in the Extension of Legal Aid and 
Promotion of Pro Bono Work 
State legal aid in civil cases is managed by the Legal Aid Bureau 
(“LAB”).278  LAB conducts a means test as well as a merits test to determine 
eligibility.  The means test is based on the disposable capital and income 
level of the applicant.279  The merits test is based on the opinion of the LAB 
(consisting of the Director of LAB and at least two private practitioners) 
whether the applicant has “reasonable grounds” for taking or defending the 
action.280  The Director possesses wide discretion to refuse granting legal 
aid.281  Legal aid work is carried out by legal officers of LAB or by private 
lawyers assigned by the Director of LAB at rates below normal legal 
costs.282  Outside of the state civil legal aid system, the Law Society283 and 
                                           
278
  See Legal Aid and Advice Act, ch.160 (1996); see also Legal Aid Bureau, About Us, 
http://app.minlaw.gov.sg/lab/about.asp (last visited May 17, 2008). 
279
  See id. § 8(2); see also Legal Aid and Advice Act, ch. 160, Second Schedule, ¶ 1 [hereinafter 
Second Schedule].  The current threshold amounts are S$10,000 (disposable capital) and S$10,000 
(disposable income) per annum.  See Second Schedule, supra, ¶ 1.  Where the applicant has disposable 
income in excess of S$2000 per annum and disposable capital in excess of S$2000, the Director may 
require the applicant to make contributions to the Legal Aid Fund pursuant to section 9(1) of the Legal Aid 
and Advice Act.  See id. ¶ 3.  “Disposable capital” refers to the property that the applicant for legal aid 
possesses or is entitled to minus the subject matter of the proceedings, his wearing apparel, tools of the 
trade, household furniture, his dwelling-house or Housing and Development Board home, savings of up to 
S$30,000 if he is aged 60 years and above, and his monies in the Central Provident Fund (“CPF”).  Id. ¶ 4.  
“Disposable income” is computed by taking the income of the applicant together with that of the spouse (if 
any) during the period of 12 months immediately preceding the date of application and deducting the 
following sums:  S$3500 per annum for each dependant, S$4500 for the applicant, an amount not 
exceeding S$1000 for rent, and the amount of the applicant’s contribution to the CPF.  Id. 
280
  Legal Aid and Advice Act, ch. 160, § 8(2)(a) (1996). 
281
  Id. § 8(3) (stating where “it appears to [the Director] unreasonable that the applicant should 
receive [legal aid] in the particular circumstances of the case . . .”). 
282
  The lawyer’s fee for “investigating and reporting or giving an opinion upon applications for the 
grant of legal aid or giving legal advice” is only S$50 per hour for work done.  See Rule 15(4), Legal Aid 
and Advice Regulations, 1 October 1995 (pursuant to Legal Aid and Advice Act (Cap. 160), § 23(1)).  That 
sum is minimal compared to the median billable hours of lawyers as reported in the CENSUS 2001, which 
indicated the following rates:  S$200-S$299 (for lawyers with fewer than three years of experience); 
S$300-S$399 (for lawyers with three to twelve years of experience); and S$400–S$499 (for lawyers with 
twelve or more years of experience).  CENSUS 2001, supra note 21, at 4.   
283
  Legal Profession Act, ch. 161, § 38(1)(f) (2001) (stating that under the Legal Profession Act, one 
of the objectives of the Law Society is to “protect and assist the public in Singapore in all matters touching 
or ancillary or incidental to the law”).  One example of civil legal aid undertaken by the Law Society is the 
Project Law Help, set up in 2004 to “1) make provision[s] for a scheme by which legal practices and 
advocates and solicitors can provide pro bono non-litigation commercial legal advice to charities, non-
profit organizations and voluntary welfare organizations; and 2) facilitate, promote, support and encourage 
a sustainable commitment to pro bono work within the legal profession in Singapore.”  LawSociety.org, 
Project Law Help, http://www.lawsociety.org.sg/lawhelp/lawhelp.asp (last visited Feb. 29, 2008).   
JUNE 2008 SINGAPORE ACCESS TO JUSTICE 637 
 
  
private organizations284 in Singapore also provide legal aid in both litigation 
and non-litigation matters. 
While the Singapore judiciary has no direct role in assigning counsel 
with regard to civil cases, it has nevertheless taken positive steps to 
encourage pro bono work amongst Singapore lawyers.  The Singapore 
judiciary has sought to encourage pro bono work amongst the lawyers as a 
“professional value,” and in this regard, a judicial commissioner was 
appointed to chair the Singapore Academy of Law’s Committee on Pro Bono 
Work.285  Notably, the Singapore High Court also assigns an advocate and 
solicitor to a vexatious litigant who is “unable on account of poverty” to 
engage a lawyer.286  In addition, within the family court there are legal 
clinics staffed by volunteer lawyers who provide legal advice to persons in 
the low-income category.287  
With respect to criminal cases, the Singapore government does not 
provide legal aid due to its perception of conflicts of interests and roles.288  
This gap is filled by the Law Society and private organizations providing 
legal assistance.  As mentioned above, the Law Society is statutorily obliged 
to “make provision for or assist in the promotion of a scheme whereby 
impecunious persons on non-capital charges are represented by 
advocates.”289  Private lawyers under the Criminal Legal Aid Scheme 
                                           
284
  The Singapore Association of Women Lawyers (“SAWL”), an affiliate of the Singapore Council 
of Women’s Organizations (the national umbrella organization of women’s organizations), has conducted 
free legal counseling to members of the public since 1976.  See SAWL.org, About Us, 
http://www.sawl.org.sg/about.html (last visited Feb. 29, 2008).  This service is presently provided to the 
public in various community centers and the Family Court.  Id.  Other private organizations, such as the 
Catholic Lawyers Guild Singapore, also provide legal assistance to those in need.  See 
http://clgsingapore.com/ (last visited Feb. 29, 2008).   
285
  See Chief Justice Chan Sek Keong, Singapore Supreme Court, Welcome Reference for the Chief 
Justice: Response By the Honourable Chief Justice Chan Sek Keong  (Apr. 22, 2006), available at 
http://app.supremecourt.gov.sg/default.aspx?pgid=1001&printFriendly=true; see THE LAW SOCIETY OF 
SINGAPORE, LEGAL AID REVIEW COMMITTEE OF THE LAW SOCIETY OF SINGAPORE REPORT 4 (on file with 
the Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal) [hereinafter LEGAL AID REVIEW REPORT]; see also Rajah & Tann, 
LLP, http://www.rajahtann.com/RajahTannCMS/partners.aspx?pid=232 (last visited Feb. 29, 2008) 
(showing that Sundaresh Menon, the Judicial Commissioner previously appointed to chair the committee, 
has since left for private legal practice).   
286
  See Supreme Court of Judicature Act, ch. 322, § 74 (1999). 
287
  See The Subordinate Courts of Singapore Family Justice Division, Services: Overview, 
http://app.subcourts.gov.sg/family/page.aspx?pageid=38742 (last visited May 4, 2008). 
288
  See 76 SINGAPORE PARLIAMENTARY REPORTS, col. 715 (noting Associate Professor Ho Peng 
Kee’s comment that “I think I have explained why, philosophically, jurisprudentially, practically, it does 
not make sense for the State to both prosecute and then defend, in the public interest.  Do not forget, when 
the State prosecutes, it goes through a very detailed process and the conclusion is that this person has done 
something which ought to be punished.  The right hand says, ‘Let’s punish him.’ The left hand says, ‘Let’s 
get him out.’  So the two are being pulled apart.”). 
289
  Legal Profession Act, ch. 161, § 38(g) (2001). 
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(“CLAS”) of the Singapore Law Society have been active in this regard.290  
A new pro bono service department has been set up by the Law Society to 
manage pro bono initiatives, including CLAS.291  Lawyers from the 
Association of Criminal Lawyers,292 a separate private entity, have also 
volunteered to provide pro bono assistance to accused persons.  Insofar as 
the Singapore judiciary is concerned, the courts play a limited, yet important 
role, pursuant to the court rules in assigning lawyers to represent the accused 
under a capital charge.293  
Litigants who cannot qualify for state legal aid and who are unable to 
obtain the services of a lawyer willing to take up a case on a pro bono basis 
are bereft of formal legal assistance unless they are willing and able to 
engage and pay a private lawyer.  The Singapore lawyer is prohibited from 
entering into contingency fee agreements with clients,294 notwithstanding 
that such agreements would enhance access to justice for persons of limited 
means.295  Moreover, relaxing the current prohibition against contingency 
fees agreements between lawyers and clients could provide the flexibility 
which the legal aid system lacks, though contingency fees models admittedly 
have their fair share of obstacles to surmount before proper 
implementation.296  Alternatively, the litigant can seek informal legal advice 
from professional lawyers without the benefit of formal legal representation 
in court.  Another option which has not been pursued actively in Singapore 
is the extension of limited rights of legal representation to paralegals for 
simpler and cost-effective legal assistance for more routine matters.  
Currently, non-lawyers such as paralegals are prohibited by statute from 
providing legal advice to clients;297 therefore any conferment of the rights of 
legal representation on the paralegal would require legislative reform.  A 
further recourse would be to seek the assistance of McKenzie298 friends or 
                                           
290
  See generally Tracy Sua, Calling All Lawyers: Legal Aid Scheme Needs Help, STRAITS TIMES 
(Singapore) (Feb. 1, 2007) (noting that in 2006, CLAS had about 360 volunteers who handled 319 criminal 
cases, which was more than twice the number of cases handled in 2005). 
291
  Law Society of Singapore: Pro Bono Services, http://www.lawsociety.org.sg/pro_bono/index.asp 
(last visited Feb. 29, 2008). 
292
  The Association was registered on Aug. 3, 2004 under the Societies Act, ch. 311 (1985). 
293
  Sing. Sup. Ct. (Crim. App.) Rules, R. 11(a) (1997). 
294
  Supra note 22. 
295
  See generally Chan, supra note 19; see generally Adrian Yeo, Access to Justice: A Case for 
Contingency Fees in Singapore, 16 SING. ACAD. L. J. 76 (2004). 
296
  See Chan, supra note 19 (noting that contingency fees raise professional ethics issues, including 
the lawyer’s susceptibility to conflicts of interests, and the lawyer’s improper assessment of risks at the 
expense of clients). 
297
  See Legal Profession Act, ch. 161, § 33 (2001) (providing sanctions for unauthorized persons who 
act as advocates and solicitors).  Section 32 provides that an unauthorized person is one whose name is not 
entered in the roll of advocates and solicitors or does not have in force a practicing certificate.  Id. at § 32. 
298
  This term is based on the famous English case of McKenzie v. McKenzie, [1970] 3 All E.R. 1034. 
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lay assistants who may help to take notes during court proceedings and 
provide moral support.  Like paralegals, these McKenzie friends and lay 
assistants in Singapore are not, as will be apparent below, entitled to provide 
the legal advice that is currently the sole domain of the qualified lawyer.  
There is clearly a need to explore possible solutions to improve access 
to justice for the litigant who is ineligible for legal aid and is unable to afford 
legal representation.  A Legal Aid Review Committee was set up recently 
under the auspices of the Law Society in order to seek inputs from, inter alia, 
the Singapore Academy of Law committee on pro bono work which was 
chaired by a judicial commissioner.299 The Committee made new and 
significant recommendations, some of which have since been crystallized in 
a set of “Key Initiatives” issued by the Singapore Law Society.  These “Key 
Initiatives” included proposals for the LAB means test criteria to be 
relaxed300 and recommended that civil legal aid assistance be extended to the 
fortieth percentile of Singapore’s average household income.301  This 
eventually led to a relaxation of the means test via an increase in the 
threshold income pursuant to recent amendments to the Legal Aid and 
Advice Act in 2007.302  The Law Society had also recommended that law 
firms pledge to ensure that lawyers perform a minimum of twenty-five hours 
of pro bono work annually.303  Coupled with the proposal to set up legal 
clinics by the LAB,304 the recommendations represent important milestones 
in extending the reach of civil legal aid to Singaporeans.  In conjunction, 
CLAS has significantly raised the individual income ceiling in respect of 
criminal cases.305  These recent moves are indeed laudable.  
In Singapore, it appears the strategy to increase access to justice for 
indigent litigants is two-pronged:  the provision of state legal aid and the 
utilization of private pro bono services, moving in tandem.306  The recent 
                                           
299
  See LEGAL AID REVIEW REPORT, supra note 285, at 1. 
300
  The qualifying monthly household income for a family of four of S$1900 will be increased to 
about S$2600.  See Marcel Lee Pereira, More People to Get Lawyers’ Advice in Civil Cases, STRAITS 
TIMES (Mar. 3, 2007). 
301
  See The Law Society of Singapore, Key Initiatives Of The Law Society Following 
Recommendations Made By The Legal Aid Review Committee As Set Out In Its Report Dated December 8, 
2006 (on file with the Pacific Rim Law and Policy Journal). 
302
  Legal Aid and Advice Act, ch. 160, (Act 310 of 2007 – Legal Aid and Advice (Amendment) Act 
2007).  This amendment went into effect on July 1, 2007.  
303
  According to the CENSUS 2001, the average time spent on pro bono work per lawyer from 
November 2000 to October 2001 was 32 hours and respondents considered the appropriate average time 
spent on pro bono work should be 46 hours.  CENSUS 2001, supra note 21, at vii, 114. 
304
  See Khushwant Singh, Income Ceiling for Aid to be Upped to $1700: Needy Get Better Access to 
Legal Aid for Civil, Criminal Cases, STRAITS TIMES (Mar. 3, 2007). 
305
  Id. 
306
  This two-pronged approach is also consistent with the principle adopted by the Centre for Legal 
Process, Law Foundation of New South Wales that “[p]ro bono legal services complement, and do not 
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initiatives buck the trend in other developed countries where state legal aid 
is being reduced while pro bono work is encouraged to fill the gaps left by 
declining state legal aid.307  Not surprisingly, this trend in other developed 
nations has not been well received by all quarters.308  Singapore is 
experimenting with pro bono services during these initial stages and at least 
for now, pro bono work is only encouraged, rather than being mandatory.309 
b. Concrete Steps by the Singapore Judiciary to Enhance Access to 
Justice for Litigants in Person and Suggestions for Reform 
The increase in the number of litigants in person310 in developed 
countries311 should prompt us to closely examine the manner and extent of 
their access to the courts.  Within the Singapore Subordinate Courts, the 
proportion of unrepresented litigants in maintenance cases and family 
violence cases respectively is very significant.312  Furthermore, the 
percentage of unrepresented litigants in divorce cases is fairly high.313  In 
view of the figures, it is therefore important to find out if more assistance, 
whether of a legal or non-legal nature, should be provided to such litigants in 
                                                                                                                              
replace, publicly funded legal services.”  See LAW AND JUSTICE FOUNDATION OF NEW SOUTH WALES, 
FUTURE DIRECTIONS FOR PRO BONO LEGAL SERVICES IN NEW SOUTH WALES 8 (Access to Justice Series, 
2002).  
307
  See generally Francis Regan, Legal Aid Without The State: Assessing The Rise of Pro Bono 
Schemes, 33 UNIV. B.C. L. REV. 383 (1999-2000).  For a view that the provision of pro bono work is itself 
vulnerable to market forces in the United States. see Rebecca L. Sandefur, Lawyers’ Pro Bono Service and 
American-Style Civil Legal Assistance, 41 L. & SOC. REV. 79 (2007). 
308
  See e.g., Andrew Boon & Robert Abbey, Moral Agendas? Pro Bono Publico in Large Law Firms 
in the United Kingdom, 60 MOD. L. REV. 630, 634 (1997) (providing an example of a trend not well 
received).  In the United Kindgom., the Law Society’s Pro Bono Working Party pointed out that pro bono 
publico must not be seen as a substitute for legal aid.  Id. 
309
  Cf. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, R. 6.1 (2002) (stating “[e]very lawyer has a professional 
responsibility to provide legal services to those unable to pay.  A lawyer should aspire to render at least 
fifty (50) hours of pro bono publico legal services per year . . . .”). 
310
  Commonly referred to as pro se litigants in the United States and unrepresented litigtants in 
Australia. 
311
  With respect to England, see George Applebey, Justice Without Lawyers? Litigants in Person in 
the English Civil Courts, 18 HOLDSWORTH L. REV. 109, 109-10 (1997); for Hong Kong, see RESOURCE 
CTR. FOR UNREPRESENTED LITIGANTS, REPORT OF THE STEERING COMMITTEE ON RESOURCE CENTRE FOR 
UNREPRESENTED LITIGANTS, ¶ 1.2, available at http://rcul.judiciary.gov.hk/rc/eng/screport/ 
RC%20Report.pdf [hereinafter RESOURCE CTR. FOR UNREPRESENTED LITIGANTS]. 
312
  For 2005, the figures were 95.2% (maintenance cases: complainants only); 99.3% (maintenance 
cases: respondents only); 96.5% (family violence: complainants only) and 99.7% (family violence: 
respondents only) respectively.  In 2006, the corresponding figures for the first three categories had 
increased slightly to 96.0%, 99.6% and 97.1%, while the figure for family violence: respondents only 
decreased marginally to 99.3%.  The statistics have been kindly provided by the Subordinate Courts (on file 
with the author). 
313
  In 2005, the percentages of unrepresented litigants were 39.1% (divorce: plaintiffs only) and 
39.0% (divorce: defendants only).  In 2006, the figures have increased to 43.2% and 43.1% respectively. 
The statistics have been kindly provided by the Subordinate Courts (on file with the author). 
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person to attain, as far as possible, equal access to justice vis-à-vis other 
litigants with legal representation.  
An in-house study was conducted by the Subordinate Courts in 2005 
on Parties in Person in both the family court and SCTs.314  As the users of 
SCTs are not permitted legal representation to begin with, it might be more 
useful to focus on litigants in the family court who could have engaged 
lawyers but were not legally represented for various reasons.  A majority of 
the litigants in person in the family court were in the low-income group.315  
Of the reasons cited for being self-represented, the majority (55%) said they 
could not afford a lawyer while a smaller proportion (29%) felt they did not 
require the services of a lawyer.316  In terms of legal needs, the respondents 
ranked the need for information as follows:  court procedures (52.1%), 
relevant law (29.6%), and court room formalities (22.9%).317  The study also 
revealed a lack of awareness among the respondents concerning the LAB 
and the services and programs provided by the Subordinate Courts (such as 
the Multi-Door Courthouse, information brochures, the family court legal 
clinic and the judiciary website) to assist litigants in person.318  However, for 
the litigants in person who have utilized the services, the majority response 
was that the court location, facilities, information, and services were 
accessible.319 
To the author’s knowledge, there has yet to be a significant study 
conducted on the litigation performance of litigants in person as compared to 
litigants with legal representation in Singapore.  Nevertheless, research 
conducted in the United Kingdom and Australia suggests that litigants in 
person are likely to perform worse than their legally-represented 
counterparts in accordance with certain specified comparators.  In the United 
Kingdom, a recent study by Moorhead and Sefton on four English courts, in 
first instance civil and family proceedings, indicated that litigants in person 
tended to commit more mistakes than litigants with legal representation and, 
further, that the litigants in person were more likely to make more serious 
errors.320  The types of mistakes examined in the study included errors which 
are obvious from the file, which concern procedural and administrative 
                                           
314
  See CReST Paper, supra note 25, at 4. 
315
  The majority (68%) had monthly incomes of less than S$1500 and the average income is S$1075.  
Id.   
316
  Id. 
317
  Id. 
318
  Id. 
319
  Id.  The paper did not define the term “accessible.” 
320
  RICHARD MOORHEAD & MARK SEFTON, DEP’T OF CONST, AFF., LITIGANTS IN PERSON: 
UNREPRESENTED LITIGANTS IN FIRST INSTANCE PROCEEDINGS 151 (2005), available at 
http://www.dca.gov.uk/research/2005/2_2005.pdf. 
642 PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL VOL. 17 NO. 3 
 
 
matters (as opposed to an assessment of the merits of the case or the 
strategies adopted by litigants), fundamental misunderstandings of relevant 
issues, and failures to address essential aspects of a case.321  The evidence 
also suggested that the litigants in person experienced more problems with 
documentation.322  Another study conducted in Australia has focused on the 
inadequacies of litigants in person or, alternatively, the relative success rates 
in litigation, the likelihood of discontinuation of a case and the likelihood of 
having to pay the costs of the other party.323  
Cognizant of the need to provide more assistance to litigants in 
person, the Subordinate Courts of Singapore have initiated a pilot Lay 
Assistant Scheme whereby law students324 may provide non-legal assistance 
to litigants in person such as taking notes at hearings and performing 
administrative tasks.325  The scope of the scheme is limited to litigants in 
person involved in maintenance cases pursuant to the Women’s Charter.326  
The pilot project relates only to applications for the maintenance of the wife 
and children where:  1) one party is legally represented and 2) the litigant in 
person is unable to afford a lawyer and has chosen not to apply for one or 
                                           
321
  Id. at 129. 
322
  Id. at 139. 
323
  See Helen Gamble & Richard Mohr, Litigants in Person in the Federal Court of Australia and the 
Administrative Appeals Tribunal (unpublished paper presented to the Sixteenth AIJA Annual Conference 
Melbourne (Sept. 4-6, 1998)), available at http://www.uow.edu.au/law/crt/litigants.html.  This is a 
collaborative research project to evaluate the impact of litigants in person on the management of judicial 
business conducted jointly by the Federal Court of Australia, Administrative Appeals Tribunal, Centre for 
Court Policy and Administration, University of Wollongong and the Justice Research Centre in Sydney.  
Id.  
324
  See Implementation of Lay Assistant Scheme (Pilot Phase), The Subordinate Courts of Singapore, 
http://app.subcourts.gov.sg/family/newsdetails.aspx?pageid=27144&cid=27174 (last visited Sept. 3, 2007).  
These are law students from the Pro Bono Group, a student club set up under the Law Management 
Council, Law Faculty, National University of Singapore (“NUS”).  The website states that this group of law 
students “strongly believe that volunteer legal service brings benefits to both the community and the 
volunteer, and we seek to spread this message to our peers by informing them about the pro bono 
movement in Singapore and to involve them in pro bono service.”  See NUS Pro Bono Group, About Us, 
http://nusprobono.wordpress.com/about-us/ (last visited Sept. 3, 2007). 
325
  See Ansley Ng, Law Undergrads in Court’s Pilot Scheme, TODAYONLINE, Jan. 5, 2007.  The 
Singapore Management University runs a compulsory two-week community service attachment program 
for its students.  It is envisaged that the students from the School of Law may, under this program, pursue 
attachments with organizations involved in legal aid and pro bono work.  See SINGAPORE MANAGEMENT 
UNIVERSITY, BACHELOR OF LAWS PROGRAMME, http://www.law.smu.edu.sg/blaw/index.asp (last visited 
May 4, 2008); see SINGAPORE MANAGEMENT UNIVERSITY, BACHELOR OF LAWS STUDENT HANDBOOK, 
http://info.smu.edu.sg/courses/index.asp (follow “LLB Handbook” hyperlink) (last visited May 4, 2008).   
326
  See Implementation of Lay Assistant Scheme (Pilot Phase), The Subordinate Courts of Singapore, 
http://app.subcourts.gov.sg/family/newsdetails.aspx?pageid=27144&cid=27174 (last visited Sept. 3, 2007); 
Women’s Charter, ch. 353 (1997 Rev. Ed.) (Sing.) (This Act was most recently amended in 2005), 
available at http://statutes.agc.gov.sg/ (search “353” in the “Go to Cap. No.” box; then follow the 
“Women’s Charter” hyperlink). 
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has not qualified for legal aid.327  Participation in the Lay Assistant Scheme 
is voluntary.328  The Subordinate Courts emphasize that the availability of a 
lay assistant is “not guaranteed and is not an entitlement.”329  The website of 
the Subordinate Courts refers to a leaflet provided to the litigant in person 
which briefly explains the Lay Assistance Scheme.  It states that the lay 
assistant may explain the hearing process to the litigant in person, assist in 
the preparation of paper work, and take notes at the hearing.330  However, the 
lay assistant cannot, inter alia, give legal advice or address the court unless 
special permission is granted.331  
Litigants are also entitled to seek the help of McKenzie friends in 
Singapore courts.332  The English Court of Appeal recently stated that the 
purpose of allowing a litigant in person the assistance of a McKenzie friend 
is “to further the interests of justice by achieving a level playing field and 
ensuring a fair hearing.”333  It is the litigant in person who possesses the 
right to assistance, as opposed to the McKenzie friend’s right to act as 
one.334  In the case of Wee Soon Kim Anthony v. UBS AG, Kan J., citing 
English precedents335 in support, regarded a “McKenzie friend” who takes 
his responsibilities seriously as a “help not only to the litigant who seeks his 
assistance, but also to the court.”336  However, the learned judge cautioned 
that those who abuse the privilege by disregarding directions of the court, 
who pursue an agenda beyond helping the litigant, or who use the privilege 
as a backdoor to legal practice should be excluded.337  In Wee Soon Kim 
Anthony v. UBS AG, the learned judge rejected the litigant’s application for a 
McKenzie friend as the person assisting the litigant in the case was intending 
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  See Implementation of Lay Assistant Scheme (Pilot Phase), The Subordinate Courts of Singapore, 
http://app.subcourts.gov.sg/family/newsdetails.aspx?pageid=27144&cid=27174 (last visited Sept. 3, 2007). 
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  Id. 
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  Id. 
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  Id. 
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  See generally Wee Soon Kim Anthony v. UBS AG, [2003] 1 Sing. L. Rep. 833. 
333
  In the matter of the children of Mr O’Connell, Mr Whelan and Mr Watson [2005] E.W.C.A. (Civ.) 
759, at ¶ 128(1) (Eng.); see also Lord Woolf M.R. in R v. Bow County Court, ex parte Pelling, [1999] 1 
W.L.R. 1807, 1825 (Eng.) (stating “the help which a McKenzie friend can properly give a litigant in person 
could assist in achieving equality between the parties . . . .”) [hereinafter Pelling]. 
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  Pelling, supra note 333, at 1824. 
335
  McKenzie v. McKenzie [1970] 3 All E.R. 1034; Regina v. Leicester City Justices ex. P. Barrow, 
(1991) 2 Q.B. 260 (U.K.); Pelling, supra note 333. 
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  Wee Soon Kim Anthony v. UBS AG, [2003] 1 Sing. L. Rep. 833, ¶ 18; see also Office of the 
President of the Family Division [2005] 35 Fam. 405 (U.K.) (emphasizing in the guidance notes that the 
presumption in favor of McKenzie friends is a “strong” one). 
337
  Wee Soon Kim Anthony v. UBS AG, [2003] 1 Sing. L. Rep. 833, ¶ 18. 
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to make the submissions to the court on behalf of the litigant in person as if 
he were an advocate, going beyond the role allotted to a McKenzie friend.338  
The proper role and perspective of a judge in a court proceeding 
toward a litigant in person has also been judicially examined in Singapore.339  
The scope for direct legal assistance provided by a judge to a litigant in 
person in a court case is, not surprisingly, fairly restricted.  In Soong Hee 
Sin, the court stated that the district judge has no duty to advise the accused 
of the significance or relevance of restitution in sentencing.340  As such, the 
failure of the judge to do so did not vitiate his subsequent discretion in 
sentencing.341  The learned judge explained that the role of a judge was to 
serve as “an independent and unbiased adjudicator” and hence a judge 
should not “proffer or extend his own legal advice” to the disputing 
parties.342 
Although the judges should be impartial and refrain from providing 
legal advice to the litigants, the judiciary can do more to assist the litigants 
in person.  This Article proposes that the judiciary should also, as a matter of 
practice, provide information directly to the litigants in person of the 
availability of legal aid prior to the hearing.  Where the litigant in person 
does not qualify for legal aid, the judge should explain to the litigant in 
simple terms the main purpose of the hearing as well as some basic aspects 
of court procedures and formalities to level the playing field, where the other 
party is legally represented.  In conjunction, the court administrators could 
also ensure that such information be made available to the litigants prior to 
the hearing to reduce the time spent by the judge to educate the litigant on 
court formalities and procedures. 
Apart from the Lay Assistant Scheme and McKenzie friends, the 
Subordinate Courts have provided a court concierge service to assist 
members of the public with directions to court rooms and information on 
court schedules.343  The Singapore Subordinate Courts have stated clearly on 
the judiciary website the roles and responsibilities of court staff with respect 
                                           
338
  Id. ¶ 19.  In the United Kingdom, the rights of audience of a person who is not an advocate and 
solicitor is provided according to the Courts and Legal Services Act 1990, § 27; see Paragon Finance plc v. 
Noueiri [2001] 1 W.L.R. 2357 at  ¶¶ 54, 58 (Eng.) (addressing the judicial discretion to grant such rights on 
an exceptional basis). 
339
  The author understands that the Singapore Subordinate Courts circulates an Equal Treatment 
Bench Guide—a set of internal guidelines which provides for the proper judicial approach towards litigants 
in person.  This document, however, is not made available to the public and is currently undergoing review.  
340
 Soong Hee Sin v. Public Prosecutor, [2001] 2 Sing. L. Rep. 253, ¶ 9. 
341
  Id. ¶ 9. 
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  Id. ¶ 7.  See also Saravanan s/o Ganesan v. Public Prosecutor, [2003] S.G.H.C. 273, ¶ 44; 
Rajeevan Edakalavan v. Public Prosecutor, [1998] 1 Sing. L. Rep. 815, ¶ 22. 
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  See Tracy Sua, Need Help? Ask a Court Concierge, STRAITS TIMES, Jun. 2, 2006. 
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to disputes commenced at the family court.344  For example, court staff will 
help litigants find hearing lists and contact details for the Legal Aid Bureau 
and Law Society, but will stop short of providing legal advice and advice on 
the language used for court documentation.345  Further, the court website 
provides useful information on the possible non-litigious avenues for 
litigants in person such as the Community Mediation Unit and the Ministry 
of Community Development, Youth, and Sports.346  Additionally, it sets out 
the appropriate court behavior for litigants unfamiliar with court procedures 
and etiquette.347  With respect to disputes dealt with by the SCTs, the 
Subordinate Courts have, as stated above, provided a user-friendly DIY kit 
on matters relating to filing claims at SCTs, form-filling procedures, simple 
checklists of items which serve as reminders for litigants, 
consultation/mediation processes, and preparations for court hearings.348  For 
the benefit of litigants in person, in civil cases, the court provides a write-up 
outlining procedures from the commencement of a civil action to the court 
judgment and appeal.349   
c. Recommendations for Enhancing Access to Justice for Litigants in 
Person 
The Singapore judiciary has indeed taken concrete and extensive steps 
to enhance access to justice for litigants in person.  Some comparisons may 
also be made with developments elsewhere as the Singapore judiciary 
continually seeks refinements and improvements.   
In particular, the following initiatives, which have been implemented 
in other common law jurisdictions to augment access to justice for the poor, 
warrant attention.  In Hong Kong, for instance, the judiciary is pro-active in 
consciously integrating and coordinating the provision of legal assistance by 
legal professionals, non-governmental organizations, and other bodies 
through a dedicated Resource Centre at the judiciary premises.350  In 
Australia, the federal courts provide a Referral for Legal Assistance 
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  See Subordinate Courts of Singapore, Civil Justice Division, Processes, 
http://app.subcourts.gov.sg/sct/index.aspx (last visited Sept. 3, 2007) . 
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  See Subordinate Courts of Singapore, Civil Justice Division, Conducting a Civil Trial in Person, 
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Scheme.351  Each of the Australian courts has a list of pro bono practitioners 
who have agreed to provide pro bono work.352   
Having a list of pro bono lawyers, at the convenient access of the 
litigant in person, would assist in saving time and costs in seeking lawyers.  
However, should the Singapore judiciary play a more pro-active role in 
providing a list of lawyers willing to provide pro bono work, there should be 
an explicit caveat that the pro bono lawyers are not the recommendations of 
the judges, but merely provided for informational purposes.  Otherwise, 
there may be criticisms of judicial biases and conflicts of interests in the 
choice of lawyers in a particular case. 
Apart from education on court procedures and formalities, 
transparency and public access to the proper judicial treatment towards 
litigants in person are also paramount.  The Judicial Studies Board, the body 
established in 1979 and responsible for training judges in England and 
Wales, has drafted guidelines (the Equal Treatment Bench Book) on the 
proper approaches courts should adopt towards the poor and other 
disadvantaged litigants in proceedings—in short, equal access to justice.353  
For instance, the Bench Book encourages the court to clearly explain its 
decision and the reasons therefore to litigants in person, including drawing 
to their attention the question of costs and rights of appeal.354  It urges judges 
not to see litigants in person as a problem for the judiciary, but rather to 
examine their needs.355  The Bench Book focuses on unrepresented parties 
and the difficulties they face (such as unfamiliarity with the law and court 
procedures), and it provides guidance for judges to ensure a fair hearing.356  
One section on “Poverty and the county courts” provides information for the 
benefit of judges on the following:  the work of the county courts in helping 
creditors to recover monies from debtors, the scale of poverty in Britain, the 
benefits system, the minimum wage and tax credits system, and mortgage 
repossession cases.357  Thus, the English judges are expected to be aware of 
the circumstances facing financially disadvantaged litigants and the benefits 
available to such individuals. To reinforce the role poverty plays in 
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  See Federal Court of Australia, Federal Court Legal Assistance Scheme,  
 http://www.fedcourt.gov.au/litigants/general/legalassistance.html (last visited Sept. 3, 2007). 
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  See Federal Court of Australia, Getting Legal Help,  
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impacting access to justice, the Bench Book also makes ample reference to 
Community Legal Service (managed by the Legal Services Commission) to 
aid the poor in obtaining legal assistance as well as civil legal aid.358  Judges 
are advised to adjourn or postpone proceedings in appropriate cases to 
enable the litigant in question to obtain legal assistance and to direct the 
unrepresented litigants to appropriate legal help as required.359   
This Article proposes that the Singapore judiciary should examine the 
Equal Treatment Bench Book carefully (in particular, the portions on 
litigants in person and poverty issues) which may be adapted for use to 
improve access to justice for the poor in Singapore.  In order to improve 
public awareness of the judicial roles, there should also be transparent access 
of the guidelines to members of the public.  As discussed above, the 
Singapore judiciary has undertaken great efforts to allow greater public 
access to its court judgments and technological facilities.  Access to judicial 
guidelines on the proper treatment of litigants in person and indigent 
litigants should follow as a corollary.  
Finally, under this third institutional approach, this Part has examined 
the use of the SCTs’ processes to reduce legal costs for litigants in person.  
Technological advancements within the Singapore judiciary have, on the 
whole, improved the administration of justice in Singapore, without 
compromising access to justice for indigent litigants.  However, some areas 
still need improvement.  While court-based mediation has enabled the 
resolution of a large majority of cases without the need for prolonged trials, 
questions still linger on the practicality of mediation in a situation of serious 
inequality of power (including financial prowess) between the litigants, such 
as where a large corporation is opposed by a financially disadvantaged 
litigant.  Comparative developments in Hong Kong, Australia, and England 
can further assist the Singapore judiciary in refining approaches in the 
coordination of legal aid and pro bono work, as well as in the provision of 
assistance to litigants in person.  
IV. CONCLUSION 
Doing justice must count as at least one of the central tasks of the 
judiciary and the paramount objective of achieving equal access to justice 
cannot remain as mere rhetoric.  In this regard, the scorecard is, on the 
whole, a positive one.  The overall efforts of the Singapore judiciary in 
enhancing access to justice have been fairly comprehensive and proactive.  
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Despite the absence of a strong rights-based constitutional jurisprudence 
relating to access to justice, the concrete plans and programs implemented 
by the judiciary, coupled with significant public policy statements by its top 
echelons, speak volumes of the drive to attain greater access to justice for 
the poor.  It is fair to say that, based on the three approaches examined above 
(economic, procedural and institutional), the judicial practice working 
towards access to justice in Singapore has surpassed its constitutional 
rhetoric.  
However, the Singapore judiciary should attempt to further improve 
access to justice for the poor as recommended in Part III above.  This task of 
maintaining and promoting access to justice for the poor is by no means an 
easy one.  It requires continual and painstaking endeavors in close 
coordination and cooperation with efforts undertaken by other state organs 
such as the Legal Aid Bureau, the Law Society, and other private 
organizations, underscored by a strong desire to “do justice” for the poor. 
